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FULL COURT PRESS:
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
A NEW CHALLENGE TO THE NCAA
William B. Gould IV,* Glenn M. Wong,** and Eric Weitz***
In recent years, a host of issues have arisen between the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and the college athletes who
provide the labor from which the NCAA and its member universities derive
their profits. Many of these issues have been heavily publicized and have
spurred a heated debate over the status of college athletes and the future of
the collegiate athletic system. This Article primarily focuses on the issue
of college athletes’ status as employees for purposes of federal labor law.
The significant increase in the popularity of college sports in recent
years has led to conference realignment, facility building and arms race,
governance issues and litigation. The student-athletes, the players in the
highly lucrative college football and basketball games have been left
behind. They have resorted to challenging the NCAA’s system in many
different ways.
Recently, football players at Northwestern University successfully
petitioned their local Regional Director of the National Labor Relations
Board for a union representation election, arguing that they are employees
of the University and as such are entitled to collective bargaining rights and
other protections under the National Labor Relations Act. Northwestern

*The Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus at Stanford Law School; Chairman
of the National Labor Relations Board, 1994-1998; Chairman of the California Agricultural
Labor Relations Board, 2014-; Member of the National Academy of Arbitrators since 1970;
Consultant to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1966-67.
**Professor, Mark H. McCormack Department of Sport Management, Isenberg School of
Management, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA; Lecturer in Law, Stanford Law
School; J.D., Boston College Law School; B.A. Brandeis University. Professor Wong is the
author of ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW (4th ed. 2010) and THE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
CAREERS IN SPORTS (2d. ed. 2012). The author would like to thank Krista Whitaker and Michael
Matt for their research assistance in preparing this article.
***J.D., Stanford Law School, 2014.

1

FULL COURT PRESS (DO NOT DELETE)

2

7/2/2015 1:53 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

University has rejected this argument and has appealed the Regional
Director’s decision to the National Labor Relations Board in Washington,
D.C. This Article provides a background for the highly contested dispute,
refutes some of the common arguments made against the potential
unionization of college athletics, and discusses some of the potential
implications if players can and do form a union.
I. INTRODUCTION
The NCAA is currently facing historic and unprecedented
challenges from outside parties that seek to create vast waves of change to
the current model of intercollegiate athletics. The issues at stake are by no
means revolutionary, as the battle between the NCAA and student-athletes
seeking better treatment and/or a fair share of revenues has been ongoing
for nearly 100 years. 1 But in the last five to ten years, the number of cases
and legal basis for some of the cases are new. Major antitrust and labor
law litigation against the NCAA, its conferences and its institutions has
culminated in 2014 with two major trials that aim to significantly alter the
current NCAA model. The O’Bannon v. NCAA case in federal court and
the Northwestern University case before the National Labor Relations
Board (hereinafter “the Board”) are the two cases in litigation, along with
several other cases in the pre-trial phase that allege antitrust violations tied
to grant-in-aid caps and cost of attendance discrepancies. 2
1. E.g., Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to
Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1003, 1005-1006 (2012) (“In 1936, in a
story followed closely by the black and left-wing press, the Howard University football team
struck for several games, demanding adequate medical supplies for players, nutritional food, and
access to campus jobs. Two years later, the Louisiana State University football team dismissed a
player after ‘he dared to ‘agitate a union’ of the players.’ But the most high-profile disputes of
the New Deal era centered on the University of Pittsburgh’s top-ranked football program. After
an undefeated 1937 season garnered the squad a Rose Bowl invitation, players demanded $200 in
pocket money for their participation. When university officials balked, the players voted 17-16 to
boycott the game … The thirty-odd members of the freshman squad threatened to stike again
several months later. Their demands included four-year athletic scholarships, shorter working
hours, accommodation for class time missed due to football obligations, and collective bargaining
rights.”).
2. There are currently four major cases against the NCAA involving scholarship cap
issues and cost of attendance discrepancies that have been consolidated with the previouslyconsolidated Jenkins v. NCAA and Alston v. NCAA cases. The four plaintiffs, listed
chronologically from the original filing of their suit, are Kendall Gregory-McGhee (former
football player at Minnesota & Northern Colorado), Sharrif Floyd et. al. (former football players
at Florida), Nick Kindler (former football player at West Virginia), and Alex Lauricella (former
football player at Tulane). See Jon Solomon, Judge Draws NCAA Doubleheader With O’Bannon,
Scholarship Cases, CBS SPORTS (June 17, 2014, 1:42 PM),
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The attacked status quo is well described by The London
Economist, paraphrasing Taylor Branch 3: “[f]or decades . . . the best
coaches earn millions of dollars while the best players live hand to
mouth . . . for colleges to make millions from the unpaid labour of mostly
black athletes carried ‘the whiff of the plantation.’” 4
Similarly accurate of collegiate profligate living, in our view, is the
following New York Times commentary:
The head football coach at Alabama makes
year, and his staff is also very well paid.
coordinator makes $680,000 a year, and
coordinator makes $1.35 million. The
conditioning coach earns $395,000.

$6.9 million a
The offensive
the defensive
strength and

At Ohio State, the football team moved into a $2.5 million,
10,000-square-foot locker room at its training complex,
complete with a deluxe lounge outfitted with highdefinition televisions. It also has a waterfall.
When Florida State and Auburn qualified for last season’s
Bowl Championship Series title game, their conferences
each received $18 million.
This is a portrait of life in the wealthiest districts of college
sports.
The denizens of these rarefied quarters, universities like
Alabama and Louisiana State, are still institutions of
higher education. But athletics have become ever more
central to their missions, and their bottom lines, thanks to

http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24590912/judge-draws-ncaadoubleheader-with-obannon-scholarship-cases.
3. Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC, (Sept. 7, 2011, 11:28
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-collegesports/308643/.
4. Players: 0; Colleges: $10,000,000,000, THE ECONOMIST, (Aug. 16, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21612160-pressure-grows-let-student-athletesshare-fruits-their-own-labours-players-0.
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the juggernaut programs that generate hundreds of millions
of dollars a year.
Recruiters fly on private planes, athletes train on top-ofthe-line equipment, and teams compete in mammoth
stadiums that are the envy of many professional teams. It
is not uncommon for a university’s athletic budget to
exceed $60 million.
And all of that has taken place under the N.C.A.A.’s old
rules. 5
*

*

*

*

*

In the case of O’Bannon v. NCAA, 6 lead plaintiff Ed O’Bannon
challenged the NCAA’s use of players’ names, images and likenesses
without providing compensation to the players. In May 2014, O’Bannon
and the other members of the recognized class reached a $40 million
settlement in the case against EA Sports and Collegiate Licensing
Company (but continued to pursue the case against the NCAA for antitrust
claims), having alleged that the two companies used player likenesses in
their products without providing proper compensation to the players.7 In
June 2014, the plaintiffs in Keller v. NCAA, a related case, reached a $20
million settlement with the NCAA over the use of player images and
likenesses in video games. 8 Recently, in August 2014, Judge Claudia
5. Steve Eder, Fears Rise Over Wealth Gap as Top College Conferences Push Overhaul,
N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/sports/ncaafootball/new-ruleswould-further-separate-college-sports-haves-from-have-nots.html?_r=0.
6. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW
(N.D. Cal., Aug. 8, 2014).
7. Ed O’Bannon was a former basketball standout at UCLA, where he led the Bruins to an
NCAA Championship in 1995. O’Bannon opted to take legal action against the NCAA, EA
Sports, and the Collegiate Licensing Company after discovering that his likeness was used in an
earlier iteration of an EA Sports College Basketball game. E.g., Steve Eder & Ben Strauss,
Understanding Ed O’Bannon’s Suit Against the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES, (June 9, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/sports/ncaabasketball/understanding-ed-obannons-suitagainst-the-ncaa.html?_r=0.
8. Associated Press, NCAA settles with former athletes, ESPN (June 9, 2014, 5:12 PM),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11055977/ncaa-reaches-20m-settlement-video-gameclaims.
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Wilken decided the O’Bannon antitrust claims and held that the NCAA
player compensation prohibition was an unreasonable restraint of trade
within the meaning of the Sherman Antitrust Act, specifically noting “the
association’s rules prohibiting student-athletes from receiving any
compensation for the use of the names, images, and likenesses restrains
price competition among FBS football and Division I basketball
schools . . . .” 9
Since the filing of the O’Bannon case, several other antitrust cases
have been brought against the NCAA stemming from issues with grant-inaid caps and cost-of-attendance discrepancies. Under the current system,
an institution’s grant-in-aid package only includes tuition,
college/university fees, books, and room and board – all of which are
defined by the NCAA as necessary “grant-in-aid” costs. However, it has
been estimated that the average athletic scholarship still falls several
thousand dollars below the actual cost of attendance. This is referred to as
the ‘cost of attendance gap’ in several of the lawsuits brought against the
NCAA. 10 In August 2014, the NCAA, reflecting what has been called
“Team Reform,” 11 allowed the so-called “Power Five” 12 Conferences to
“ . . . pay their athletes a few thousand dollars more than what the current
scholarship rules allow, loosen restrictions against agents and advisors, and
revamp recruiting rules to ease contact with top prospects.” 13 The retreat
appears to be on, in an attempt to stave off “Team Market,” 14 i.e., the raw

9. O’Bannon, No. C-09-3329-CW at 94; O’Bannon, No. C-09-3329-CW at 80, 87-88, 89
(Judge Claudia Wilken rejected the NCAA’s argument that the challenged restrictions on studentathlete compensation are reasonable because 1) they are necessary to preserve the tradition of
amateurism, 2) maintain the competitive balance in FBS football and Division I basketball teams,
3) promote the integration of academics and athletics, and 4) increase the total output of its
product).
10. Tribune Graphics, INFOGRAPHIC: When a Full-Ride Isn’t, CHI. TRIB. (June 24,
2014, 6:44 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-infographic-when-a-fullride-isnt20140624-htmlstory.html.
11. Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., This is Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/opinion/sunday/joe-nocera-the-ncaas-feeble-reformimpulse.html.
12. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
13. Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. May Let Top Conferences Play by Own Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/sports/n-c-a-a-s-rich-poised-to-get-richerwith-more-athlete-benefits-.html.
14. Nocera, supra note 11.
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commercialization of college sports in a manner akin to their professional
counterparts.
Two notable cases are Jenkins v. NCAA, in which the plaintiff
argues that the NCAA’s scholarship cap violates antitrust law by instituting
an illegal payment cap in an otherwise free market, 15 and Alston v. NCAA
et. al., , in which the plaintiff alleges that the NCAA and its Power Five
Conferences (ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, PAC-12 and SEC) colluded to cap the
amount of scholarship money granted to student-athletes at a value below
the actual cost of attendance. 16 These antitrust challenges brought against
the NCAA, in addition to the O’Bannon case and Northwestern University,
have shaken the legal ground defining amateurism and the NCAA model, a
trend fueled by colleges awash in money as they engage in a competitive
arms race for athletic talent. Both are cases of first impression and
groundbreaking in their respective challenges to the NCAA model, so it is
difficult to use precedent in determining a set of likely outcomes. 17
The name, image and likeness and grant-in-aid cases seek to alter
the current NCAA model through litigation. However, members of the
Northwestern University football team took a different approach in January
2014 when they filed a petition to the regional office of the National Labor
Relations Board in Chicago asking the Board to allow members of the team
to be represented by a union. 18 As explained by Ramogi Huma, a former
UCLA football player and president of the National College Players
Association, 19 “[t]his is about finally giving college athletes a seat at the
15. See Andy Staples, O’Bannon Just the Beginning: Jenkins case could unhinge NCAA,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 19, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-football/2014/06/18/obannonvs-ncaa-jenkins-mark-emmert-claudia-wilken.
16. See Lawsuit Alleges NCAA and Conferences Cap Scholarships Illegally,
INSIDEHIGHERED.COM (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2014/03/07/lawsuit-alleges-ncaa-and-conferencescap-scholarships-illegally#sthash.tOYjbuOn.dpbs.
17. Contra Ronald Katz, Right Or Wrong, Precedent Will Decide O’Bannon Case In
Favor Of NCAA, FORBES (July 21, 2014, 8:55 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/07/21/right-or-wrong-precedent-will-decideobannon-case-in-favor-of-ncaa/.
18. See Teddy Greenstein, Northwestern Football Players Seek to Join Labor Union, CHI.
TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2014) http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-28/sports/chi-northwesternfootball-players-labor-union-20140128_1_basketball-players-labor-union-national-laborrelations-board.
19. “The National College Players Association (NCPA) is a 501c3 nonprofit advocacy
group launched by UCLA football players that serves as the only independent voice for college
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table . . . [a]thletes deserve an equal voice when it comes to their physical,
academic and financial protections.” 20
This article focuses on one of these major challenges,
Northwestern University, and the attempt to unionize student-athletes. The
first part of the article discusses the NCAA college athletics economic
model, since a significant portion of its revenues is based on the current
model. It is important to understand the challenge and then also to
understand the implications to finances and to college athletics if the
plaintiffs are successful in litigation and/or the NCAA settles any of these
cases with significant changes to its current model.
The second part of this article focuses on the Northwestern
University case. The third section of this article deals with financial and
other implications if the petitioners in Northwestern University are
successful. Finally, the fourth section of this article discusses some
possible outcomes if the current NCAA model is significantly changed,
either through litigation and/or the settlement of litigation, either from
Northwestern University, O’Bannon v. NCAA, Jenkins v. NCAA, Alston v.
NCAA, or any of the antitrust cases.
II. NCAA DIVISION I REVENUES AND EXPENSES
A. Introduction
Division I is the highest level of intercollegiate athletics sanctioned
by the NCAA. The NCAA is divided into three separate divisions of
athletic competition−Division I, Division II, and Division III. 21 Division I
schools generally have the largest student bodies, manage the largest
athletic budgets, and grant the most athletic scholarships. 22
athletes across the nation.” About NCPA, NAT’L COLLEGE PLAYERS ASS’N,
http://www.ncpanow.org/about (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). The mission of the NCPA is “[t]o
provide the means for college athletes to voice their concerns and change NCAA rules.” The
NCPA has outlined 11 goals ranging from rule changes to governance reform that are designed to
improve the well-being of NCAA student-athletes. Mission & Goals, NAT’L COLLEGE PLAYERS
ASS’N, http://www.ncpanow.org/about/mission-goals (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
20. Tom Farrey, Kain Colter Starts Union Movement, ESPN (Jan. 28, 2014, 9:08 PM),
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10363430/outside-lines-northwestern-wildcats-footballplayers-trying-join-labor-union.
21. Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership (last
visited Aug. 23, 2014).
22. Division I: About the Division, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 (last
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The money in college athletics is generated by the governing body,
the NCAA, college conferences, and individual schools. This section will
provide an overview of the finances of college sports. The first part will
focus on the NCAA, the second part on college conferences, and the third
part on colleges and universities.
“The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA or
the “Association”) is an unincorporated not-for-profit
educational organization founded in 1906. The NCAA is
the organization through which colleges and universities of
the nation speak and act on athletic matters at the national
level. It is a voluntary association of more than 1,200
institutions, conferences, and organizations devoted to the
sound administration of intercollegiate athletics in all its
phases. Through the NCAA, its members consider any
athletics issue that crosses regional or conference lines and
is national in character. The NCAA strives for integrity in
intercollegiate athletics and serves as the colleges’ national
athletics governing agency. A basic purpose of the NCAA
is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of
the educational program and the athlete as an integral part
of the student body.” 23
B. NCAA Finances
From a financial perspective, the NCAA revenues are significant,
totaling over $900 million in 2012-13 as shown in Figure 1 below, with
revenues coming primarily from television and marketing rights related to
the NCAA men’s basketball tournament.

visited Aug. 23, 2014).
23. NCAA, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND SUBSIDIARIES:
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF THE YEARS ENDED AUGUST 31, 2013 AND 2012,
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION AS OF AND FOR THE YEAR ENDED AUGUST 31, 2013, AND
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 7 (2013), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/NCAA_FS_2012-13_V1%20DOC1006715.pdf
[hereinafter NCAA 2013 Financial Statements].
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Figure 1
2012-13 NCAA Revenues 24
Revenues
Television and marketing rights fees
Championships and NIT tournaments
Investment income—net
Sales and services
Contributions—facilities—net

2013 Total
$726,391,860.00
$110,631,867.00
$41,398,750.00
$27,307,562.00
$7,074,007.00

Total revenues

$912,804,046.00

Figure 2
2012-13 NCAA Percentage of Revenue by Category

Championships
and NIT
tournaments
$110,631,867.00
12%

Investment
income -- net
$41,398,750.00
4%

Sales and
services
$27,307,562.00
3%

Contributions -facilities -- net
$7,074,007.00
1%

Television and
marketing rights
fees
$726,391,860.00
80%

An examination of NCAA expenses (or distributions) by division
illustrates that the vast majority of NCAA expenses are directed towards
24. Id. at 4.
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Division I conferences and institutions. Not including association-wide
programs or management and general expenses, 91% of division-specific
NCAA expenses are spent in Division I. 25 77% of the NCAA’s divisionspecific expenses is distributed to Division I institutions, while an
additional 14% is used to fund Division I championships, programs and
NIT tournaments. 26 5% of the NCAA’s division-specific expenses is used
to fund Division II championships, distributions, and programs, while 4%
is allocated to Division III championships and programs. 27
Figure 3
2012-13 NCAA Expenses 28
Expenses
Distribution to Division I members
Division I championships, programs, & NIT tournaments
Division II championships, distribution, and programs
Division III championships and programs
Association-wide programs
Management and general

2013 Total
$527,432,377.00
$97,407,498.00
$35,650,808.00
$27,531,406.00
$122,244,138.00
$41,875,827.00

Total expenses

$852,142,054.00

A significant percentage of the money goes to Division I
universities. Most of the money is distributed to conferences, with some of
the money going directly to institutions. 29 The monies are distributed
according to various formulas within each category, and are distributed in a
combination of across-the-board directed grants and earned money. 30

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. NCAA 2013 Financial Statements, supra note 23, at 4.
30. Id. at 9.
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The remaining non-division-specific NCAA expenses include
$122,244,138 (14% of total expenses) for association-wide programs and
$41,875,827 (5% of total expenses) for management and general
expenses. 31
The NCAA also maintains a reserve fund to guard and protect the
future interests of its membership. In 2013 the NCAA reported a $92.5
million operating reserve in addition to a $326 million quasi-endowment
reserve. 32 The quasi-endowment exists specifically to “protect NCAA
membership in the event that media revenue dollars are not received due to
an interruption in the men’s basketball championship.” 33 In all, the NCAA
claimed over $589 million in unrestricted net assets during the 2013 fiscal
year. 34
As noted above, 77% of NCAA expenses are directed to Division I
membership distributions. While revenues are generally distributed to
conferences, the mechanism for distribution to individual institutions varies
across conferences depending on specific bylaws.35
It is important to note that the revenue distribution to Division I
institutions does not occur on a pro-rata basis. A large portion of revenue
distribution is based on success in the men’s basketball championship.36
This generally means that the Power Five conferences receive greater
revenue distributions than smaller conferences based on their relative
success in the tournament. 37 The Power Five conferences received
between $14.5 and $28.7 million from the NCAA basketball fund in 201213, while the distributions to other conferences ranged from $1.4 to $8.1
million. 38 The Atlantic-10 (A-10) Conference and the Metro Atlantic
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id. at 19.
33. The NCAA: Where the Money Goes, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/health-andsafety/ncaa-budget-where-money-goes (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
34. NCAA 2013 Financial Statements, supra note 23, at 19.
35. The NCAA: Where the Money Goes, supra note 33; NCAA 2013 Financial Statements,
supra note 23, at 7.
36. The NCAA: Where the Money Goes, supra note 33.
37. NCAA, 2012-2013 DIVISION I REVENUE DISTRIBUTION PLAN 7 (2012), available at
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2012-13_Revenue_Distribution_Plan.pdf (last visited
Aug. 23 2014) [hereinafter 2012-13 Plan].
38. NCAA, 2013-2014 DIVISION I REVENUE DISTRIBUTION PLAN 9 (2013), available at
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Athletic Conference (MAAC) are two of the non-Power Five conferences.
In 2012-13 the A-10 received $8,101,952 from the NCAA basketball fund,
while the MAAC received $2,209,623. 39 It should also be noted that these
revenue distribution figures do not include payouts from college football.
C. Conference Finances
There are currently 31 NCAA Division I conferences. 40 While the
historical focus of conferences was to create competition, there was also an
academic component to their formation. As stated by the SEC on its
website, “[t]he purpose of the Southeastern Conference is to assist its
member institutions in the maintenance of programs of intercollegiate
athletics which are compatible with the highest standards of education and
competitive sports.” 41 However, over the years the role of conferences has
shifted to where conferences have become more powerful, perhaps more
powerful than the NCAA itself.
As the previous section on NCAA finances shows, a large portion
of NCAA revenues are distributed to Division I institutions, with the
majority of that money flowing to the Power Five conferences. 42 However,
this “basketball” money is not the only money on the revenue side of
conferences’ financial statements. With regard to the SEC’s most recent
financial statements, “[t]he total amount of the distribution is composed of
revenue generated from televised football, bowl games, the SEC football
championship, televised basketball, the SEC men’s basketball tournament,
NCAA championships and a supplemental surplus distribution.” 43
The financial statements of NCAA Division I conferences are
generally not publicly available. The information in the following section
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2013-14%20Revenue%20Distribution%20Plan.pdf (last
visited Aug. 23, 2014) [hereinafter 2013-14 Plan].
39. Id. at 9.
40. NCAA Members by Division, NCAA,
http://web1.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec2/divisionListing (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
41. About the SEC, THE SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE (Aug. 9, 2014),
http://secsports.go.com/article/11067695/about-the-sec-conference.
42. 2012-13 Plan, supra note 37, at 9.
43. Edward Aschoff, SEC distributes record $292.8M, ESPN (May 30, 2014, 4:24 PM),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11007094/sec-distributes-record-2928-millionrevenue.
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was compiled from national media reports, not from the actual financial
statements. There is even less information available for the mid-major
Division I conferences.
As noted in the 2013-2014 NCAA Revenue Distribution Plan, the
SEC received over $15.2 million in distributions from the NCAA
basketball fund in 2012-13. 44 As the SEC reported $314.5 million in
overall revenue for the 2012-13 academic year 45 (a 15% increase from the
previous year), nearly $300 million in SEC revenue was derived from
sources outside NCAA men’s basketball fund distributions. 46
The SEC derives a large portion of its revenues from television
broadcasting contracts.47 A contract with CBS for the broadcast rights to
its top game each week and conference championship game nets the SEC a
reported $55 million per year. 48 In 2013, the conference also announced
the launch of the SEC Network, a co-venture with ESPN 49 that extended a
$2.25 billion, 15-year deal ($150 million per year, annualized) struck with
the network in 2008. 50
In May 2014, the SEC announced a record-distribution of $292.8
million, with each institution set to receive roughly $20.9 million. 51 This
figure represents over 90% of the SEC’s total revenues, and does not
include bowl game payouts ($16.8 million per participant) and NCAA

44. 2013-14 Plan, supra note 38, at 9.
45. Steve Berkowitz, Pac-12 zooms past Big Ten, SEC in college sports revenue, USA
TODAY (May 23, 2014, 8:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/05/23/pac12-conference-tax-return-revenue-record/9497233/.
46. 2013-14 Plan, supra note 38, at 9.
47. See generally Jeremy Fowler, SEC, CBS Rework Long-Term Contract, CBS SPORTS
(May 14, 2013, 4:25 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jeremyfowler/22244033/sec-cbs-rework-long-term-contract.
48. Id.
49. SEC Network to broadcast 24/7, ESPN (May 2, 2013, 4:11 PM),
http://espn.go.com/espn/story/_/id/9235260/sec-espn-announce-sec-network-2014.
50. Richard Sandomir, SEC Will Start TV Network in 2014, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/sports/ncaafootball/sec-will-have-own-tv-network-startingin-2014.html?_r=0.
51. Aschoff, supra note 43.
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academic enhancement funding ($1 million pool) directed to individual
institutions. 52
Other Power Five conferences employ different television rights
models. In 2007, the Big 10 launched the Big 10 Network, a 20-year coventure with Fox 53 that helped increase revenues to $318.4 million in 201213. 54 The Big 10 Network holds rights to most games and contests that are
not picked up by its primary rights holders, which are ESPN, CBS for
basketball, and FOX for the football conference championship game. 55
Broadcast rights revenues are shared equally by Big 10 schools, with the
exception of new member institutions, which must wait six years before
receiving a full share of the revenues.56
In May 2014, the Big 12 announced a record distribution of $220
million in revenue to member institutions.57 Similar to the Big 10, member
institutions share the distribution equally, except for new members, which
receive partial shares during the first years. 58 However, the broadcast
rights model is slightly different than those of the SEC and Big 10. 59 In the
Big 12, primary broadcast rights are held by ESPN, with Fox owning
secondary rights. 60 The tertiary broadcast rights are retained by each
52. Id.
53. Jeff Smith, Big Ten Network Celebrates Anniversary of Launch, BIG TEN (Aug. 29,
2008), http://www.bigten.org/genrel/082908aal.html.
54. Berkowitz, supra note 45.
55. Kristi Dosh, College TV Rights Deals Undergo Makeovers, ESPN (May 10, 2012,
12:56 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/705/college-tv-rights-dealsundergo-makeovers.
56. Tom Fornelli, Big Ten School Projected to Make $45 Million with New TV Deal, CBS
SPORTS (Apr. 26, 2014, 10:52 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-collegefootball/24540002/big-ten-schools-projected-to-get-45-million-with-new-tv-deal.
57. Chuck Carlton, Big 12 to Distribute Conference-Record $220 Million to Member
Schools, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (May 31, 2014, 12:05 AM),
http://www.dallasnews.com/sports/college-sports/headlines/20140531-big-12-to-distributeconference-record-220-million-to-member-schools.ece.
58. Blair Kerkhoff, Record Big 12, SEC Conference Revenue Expected to Keep Climbing,
KANSAS CITY STAR (May 31, 2013, 6:53 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/sports/spt-columnsblogs/campus-corner/article320277/Record-Big-12-SEC-conference-revenue-expected-to-keepclimbing.html.
59. See Dosh, supra note 55.
60. Id.
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institution, which allows each school to monetize those rights as the market
allows. 61 In 2011 the University of Texas launched the Longhorn Network,
a co-venture with ESPN 62 that has allowed the athletic department to
receive around $15 million annually in exchange for the third-tier rights to
its games. 63
A look at some of the available information for mid-major
conferences shows that the revenues are significantly less than the Power
Five conferences. For example, in 2013 the Mid-American Conference
received $15.7 million from participating in college football bowls, but
$12.9 million of that money came from Northern Illinois’ participation in a
BCS bowl, 64 which is an uncommon opportunity for a non-Power Five
conference institution. By comparison, the SEC earned over $52 million
from bowl game payouts in 2013. 65
D. Revenues Related to FBS Athletic Departments
Division I is subdivided based on football sponsorship. 66 The
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS), formerly known as Division I-A, is
collection of 123 NCAA Division I schools 67 with premier varsity football
programs that participate in post-season bowl games and play at least 60%
of their regular season football games against other FBS institutions. 68
61. Kerkhoff, supra note 58.
62. Natalie England, Longhorn Network Launches from UT’s South Mall,
TEXASSPORTS.COM (Aug. 27, 2011),
http://www.texassports.com/news/2011/8/27/082711aaa_91.aspx.
63. Kerkhoff, supra note 58.
64. Jon Solomon, NCAA Audit: Every Football Conference Made Money on 2012-2013
Bowls, AL.COM (Dec. 11, 2013, 5:00 AM),
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/12/bowl_money_101_ncaa_audit_show.html.
65. Id.
66. Division I: About the Division, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 (last
visited Aug. 23, 2014).
67. NCAA Sports Sponsorship: Football Bowl Subdivision, NCAA,
http://web1.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec2/sponsorship?sortOrder=0&division=1A&sport=MFB (last
visited Aug. 23, 2014).
68. Division I: About the Division, supra note 66; 2013-2014 NCAA Division I Manual
art. 20.9.9.2. The Football Championship Subdivision (FCS), formally known as Division I-AA,
is the other major Division I subdivision. The FCS consists of schools that participate in a
NCAA-run football championship. Additionally, Division I is comprised of a third group that
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Total revenue reported in an athletic program’s budget consists of
both allocated and generated revenues.69 Allocated revenue includes direct
and indirect support from the university, student’s fees, and government
subsidies. 70 Generated revenue consists of dollars generated directly by the
athletic department, such as ticket sales, royalties, broadcast rights, and
alumni contributions. 71 Accordingly, athletic expenditures are reported by
breaking down operating expenses line by line to illustrate where the
money is being spent.
Net revenues (total revenues in excess of total expenses) are a
measure of financial health and strength to the extent that total revenues
cover total expenses. Additionally, net generated revenues (total generated
revenues in excess of total expenses) also measure financial health, but
more importantly they may indicate self-sufficiency. 72 Positive net
generated revenues imply an athletic department can fund itself with
revenue sources independent of institutional entities outside of the
department. In 2013, FBS athletic programs generated median revenues of
$41,897,000, independent of allocated sources. 73 The largest percentage of
these revenues were derived from ticket sales (26 percent), contributions
from alumni and others (25 percent), and distributions from the NCAA and
each institutions’ respective conference (24 percent). 74 See Figure 4 below
for an illustration of where generated revenues are derived from.

does not belong to a subdivision, as those schools do not sponsor intercollegiate football
programs. Division I: About the Division, supra note 66.
69. See generally id.
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 9.
72. Daniel L. Fulks, Revenues and Expenses: NCAA Division I Intercollegiate Athletics
Programs Report 2004-2013, NCAA 11, 107 (Apr. 2014), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D1REVEXP2013.pdf.
73. Id. at 12.
74. Id. at 13.
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Figure 4 75
NCAA FBS Total Generated Revenue Distributions
Mean Values (2013)
Ticket Sales - 26%

3%
1%

NCAA and conference
distributions - 24%
Guarantees and options - 2%

3%

Cash contributions - 25%

3%

3%

9%

27%

Third party support - 0%
Concession/Program/Novelties 3%
Broadcast Rights - 3%

25%

24%

2%

Royalties/Advertising/Sponsorship
- 9%
Sports Camps - 1%
Endowment Investment Income 3%
Miscellaneous - 3%

E. Expenses Related to FBS Athletic Departments
Despite an influx of substantial generated revenues, athletics
programs are expensive to run. The median of total expenses for FBS
athletics departments in 2013 was $62,227,000, 76 and total expenses
exceeded generated revenues by $11,623,000. 77 Furthermore, the largest
athletic expenditures, comprising fifty percent of the median expense
budget, are compensation and grants-in-aid to student athletes. 78 Other
large expenditures absorbed by athletics programs include direct facilities
costs, such as building and grounds maintenance, and costs related to team
75. Percentage values are derived from the mean values, rather than medians. Id. at 41.
76. Id. at 33.
77. Id. at 20.
78. Fulks, supra note 72, at 13.
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travel and game day expenses. Most athletic departments do not generate
enough revenue to cover athletics expenses. In 2013, a total of 103 FBS
athletics programs reported negative net generated revenues (expenses
exceeded generated revenue).79 Only 20 programs reported positive net
generated revenues (generated revenue exceeded expenses); 80 however,
there was a $23,000,000 gap between profitable programs and others,
illustrating the larger variation between athletic budgets in the FBS.81
Figure 5 illustrates the breakdown of expenses incurred by FBS athletics
programs and where athletic departments generate revenues to fund such
expenses.

79. Id. at 28.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 13.
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Figure 5 82
NCAA FBS Expense Distributions
(Percentage of Total Operating Expenses)
Mean Values 2013
Grants-in-Aid - 15%
Guarantees and Options - 3%

3%

Salaries and Benefits - University paid
- 34%
Salaries and Benefits - Third Party
paid - 0%
Severance Pay - 1%

8%
15%

Team Travel - 7%

3%
Recruiting - 2%

14%
1%
1%
1%

Equipment/uniforms/supplies - 3%
Fundraising - 3%
Game Expenses - 4%

4%
3%
3%
2%

Medical - 1%

34%

Membership Dues - 1%
Sports Camps - 1%

7%
Spirit Groups - 0%

1%

Facilities Maintenance and Rental 14%
Indirect Institutional Support - 3%
Other - 8%

F. FBS – The Power Five Conferences
The financials vary considerably in the FBS division. There are 65
schools in the Power Five conferences. 83 Here are some of the selected
schools in the top part of the FBS:
82. Percentage values are derived from the mean values, rather than medians. Id. at 4142.
83. See Dennis Dodd, NCAA Proposal Would Put Power in Hands of BCS Conferences,
CBS SPORTS (Jan. 10, 2014, 12:42 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/dennisdodd/24404728/ncaa-proposal-would-put-power-in-hands-of-bcs-conferences.
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Figure 6 84
2013 Revenues and Expenses
Selected Power Five Conference Institutions 85
Revenues
Ticket sales
Contributions
Rights/licensing
Other
Student fees
School funds
Total Revenue

Texas
$60,860,735
$37,386,271
$58,771,963
$8,672,517
$0
$0
$165,691,486

Alabama
$38,904,537
$34,233,035
$46,032,919
$18,814,859
$0
$5,791,200
$143,776,550

Michigan
$43,135,543
$31,285,461
$53,950,086
$14,887,203
$0
$255,832
$143,514,125

Ohio State
$54,598,907
$22,204,606
$45,768,835
$17,066,959
$0
$0
$139,639,307

Expenses
Coaching/staff
Scholarships
Buildings/grounds

$55,238,796
$9,956,345
$25,125,236

$42,215,904
$13,281,263
$22,032,122

$44,711,328
$18,301,214
$28,972,772

$52,892,103
$15,537,209
$6,359,999

Other
Total Expenses

$56,487,208
$146,807,585

$39,535,097
$116,607,913

$39,032,997
$131,018,311

$41,448,018
$116,026,329

Total Subsidy
Subsidy Percent

$0
0

$5,791,200
4.03

$255,832
0.18

$0
0

Strong revenues and profitability are the hallmarks of these four
selected Power Five institutions. These four institutions earn some of the
highest revenues in Division I. 86 It is also important to note that revenues
surpass expenses for each of the four athletic departments. By comparison,
the median revenue for Division I athletic departments is just under $21
million. 87

84. NCAA Finances, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/schools/finances/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
85. For methodology, see Methodology for NCAA Athletic Department Revenue
Database, USA TODAY (June 4, 2014, 4:52 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/10/college-athletic-department-revenuedatabase-methodology/2150123/ [hereinafter Methodology].
86. NCAA Finances, supra note 84.
87. Id.
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G. FBS – Mid-Majors and Below
“Mid-majors” is a term more closely associated with NCAA
basketball. However, it may be an appropriate description of many of the
programs outside the Power Five conferences. The contrast is stark and
significant when comparing the athletic departments at the University of
East Carolina (American Athletic Conference), the University of Ohio
(Mid-American Conference) and Troy University (Sun Belt Conference).
Figure 7
2013 Revenues and Expenses
Selected Mid-Major Conference Institutions 88
Revenues
Ticket sales
Contributions
Rights/licensing
Student fees
School funds
Other
Total Revenue

East Carolina
$6,859,822
$5,744,975
$6,587,254
$12,368,781
$2,600,735
$1,643,665
$35,805,232

Ohio
$1,215,671
$2,204,293
$4,146,155
$15,724,403
$2,336,950
$1,637,589
$27,265,061

Troy
$622,661
$2,956,672
$1,391,685
$956,988
$11,900,270
$1,667,447
$19,505,723

Expenses
Coaching/staff
Scholarships
Buildings/grounds
Other
Total Expenses

$14,941,576
$6,931,230
$1,911,496
$12,855,192
$36,639,494

$7,894,851
$7,068,691
$1,966,678
$10,097,330
$27,027,550

$5,581,247
$4,855,126
$3,042,532
$6,026,818
$19,505,723

Total Subsidy
Subsidy Percent

$14,969,516
41.81

$18,061,353
66.24

$12,857,258
65.92

The revenues of the Power Five conference schools are on the
magnitude of five times greater than the revenues of these mid-major
institutions. The differences are especially significant with regard to ticket
sales 89 and rights and licensing. 90 The University of Texas athletic
88. Id.
89. See Methodology, supra note 85 (the USA Today database defines each category by
using the definition the NCAA provides to its member institution in reporting instructions, for
those definitions, see http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/EADA/2013AgreedUponProcedures.pdf. The
NCAA defines a number of categories, but the USA Today database combines some of those

FULL COURT PRESS (DO NOT DELETE)

22

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

7/2/2015 1:53 PM

[Vol. 35:1

department, for example, earns nearly 100 times the annual ticket revenue
of the Troy University athletic department.91
Another important aspect is the amount of the institutional
subsidy 92 received by each athletic department. The subsidies to the
selected Power Five programs range from 0 to 4.03%. 93 For the selected
mid-major institutions, institutional subsidies are much higher, between
41.81 and 66.24%. 94 At 66.24%, the institutional subsidy at Ohio
University is just below the median figure for institutions for which data
was available (66.3%). 95 The two figures also illustrate that while none of
the four selected Power Five athletic departments receive money from
student fees, all three mid-major athletic departments receive considerable
funding from student fees. 96
One of the most striking differences between the two groups on the
expense side of the equation is the amount of coach and staff salaries.97
While the percentage of the department’s budget devoted to coach and staff
categories (i.e., Broadcast Television, Radio and Internet Rights and Royalties, Licensing
Advertisements and Sponsorships are combined into the single category, “Rights/Licensing.”).
Ticket sales are defined as: “Sales of admissions to athletics events. Include ticket sales to the
public, faculty and students, and money received for shipping and handling of tickets. Does not
include amounts in excess of face value (such as preferential seating) or sales for conference and
national tournaments that are pass-through transactions.”).
90. Id. (“Rights/Licensing: Includes revenue for athletics from radio and television
broadcasts, Internet and ecommerce rights received from institution-negotiated contracts, the
NCAA and conference revenue sharing arrangements; and revenue from corporate sponsorships,
licensing, sales of advertisements, trademarks and royalties. Includes the value of in-kind
products and services provided as part of the sponsorship (e.g., equipment, apparel, soft drinks,
water and isotonic products).”).
91. NCAA Finances, supra note 84.
92. See Methodology, supra note 85 (“Total Subsidy: The sum of students fees, direct and
indirect institutional support and state money. The NCAA and others consider such funds
"allocated" or everything not generated by the department's athletics functions.”).
93. NCAA Finances, supra note 84.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Erik Brady & Jodi Upton, Mid-Majors Squeezed to Pay Up, USA TODAY (Mar. 8,
2007, 2:00 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2007-03-07-midmajor-coach-salary_N.htm; Methodology, supra note 85 (“Coaching/staff: All salaries, bonuses
and benefits reported on the university's tax forms for coaches and staff, as well as third-party
contributions.”).
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salaries is not dramatically different between the two sets of institutions,
the absolute amount of coach and staff compensation is much lower at the
mid-major institutions. 98 This is emblematic of a system that rewards
successful mid-major coaches and staff members with lucrative
opportunities at higher levels of college athletics.99 In many cases, the
mid-major institutions find it difficult to compete with the salaries and
prestige offered by many Power Five institutions.100 In the end, mid-major
institutions have trouble meeting many financial challenges brought on by
the lack of revenue-generating programs that help to subsidize other
sports. 101
H. Revenue Growth Over the Last Seven Years
There has been significant revenue growth in Division I athletics over
the past seven years, especially at the top of FBS football.102

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. NCAA Finances, supra note 84.

FULL COURT PRESS (DO NOT DELETE)

24

7/2/2015 1:53 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

Figure 8 103
Revenue Growth for Selected FBS Institutions (2006 – 2013)
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Alabama and Wisconsin, two Power Five conference institutions
have enjoyed very strong revenue growth since 2006. 104 In just seven
years, Wisconsin increased its revenues by over 89%. Alabama posted a
112% increase in revenue during the same period.105 The chart also shows
the revenue growth of the athletic department at Ohio University. 106 While
Ohio totaled just over $27 million in revenue in 2013, the athletic
department posted revenue growth of 66% between 2006 and 2013.107
Despite the strong revenue growth shown by the Ohio athletic
department, the fact remains that the gap between mid-major institutions

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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and Power Five institutions is widening. 108 This growing disparity is likely
to continue and even increase, as the Power Five conferences negotiate (or
renegotiate) their conference football and men’s basketball media contracts,
and/or realize the growth of revenues from regional networks and the
acquisition of new and larger markets. The addition of Maryland and
Rutgers to the Big 10 is one such example of a conference substantially
increasing its television footprint in search of increased broadcast
revenues. 109 Additionally, the introduction of the College Football Playoff
will result in a new football bowl payout structure, likely one that directs
more resources towards the Power Five conferences. 110
III. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
A. Introduction
In 2014, the Chicago Regional Director of the National Labor
Relations Board held that Northwestern University football players were
employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”). 111 This decision, which may not be resolved on appeal for a
number of years, 112 has created an enormous number of attacks, coming in
the press 113 as well as from Congress, 114 which has responded with a
108. NCAA Finances, supra note 84.
109. Ben Straus, The Big Ten’s Bigger Footprint, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/business/the-big-tens-biggerfootprint.html?pagewanted=all&r=0.
110. Brett McMurphy, Power Conferences Likely to Receive Most of Playoff Revenue,
CBS SPORTS (June 18, 2012, 7:57 PM),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/19378895/power-conferences-likely-to-receivemost-of-playoff-revenue.
111. Decision and Direction of Election, Northwestern Univ., Case 13-RC-121359
(N.L.R.B. Region 13, Mar. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Regional Director’s Decision].
112. Ann Killion, Court Case Could Make or Break Title IX, SF GATE (Apr. 5, 2014,
11:39 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/collegesports/article/Court-case-could-make-or-break-TitleIX-5379767.php; see generally WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW
74-75 (5th ed. 2013); Am. Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); cf. Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964). Although the
Board’s election decisions cannot be directly appealed to the federal courts, employers can
transform adverse election decisions into unfair labor practice proceedings by refusing to bargain
with the union, which can then be appealed.
113. E.g., Patrick T. Harker, Student Athletes Shouldn’t Unionize, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/opinion/student-athletes-shouldnt-unionize.html;
Douglas Belkin, Melanie Trottman & Rachel Bachman, College’s Football Team Can Unionize,
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condemnation eerily reminiscent of the way in which the organization of
professional sports players was greeted. 115 Though Board doctrine relating
to employee status is not predicated upon revenues received by the
employer—jurisdiction is asserted on the basis of the volume of business
conducted across state lines 116—the trigger for union organizing no doubt
finds its roots in the big business that so-called “amateur” sport has
become. 117 Players are not sharing in this. 118
For instance, in Northwestern itself, the Regional Director noted:
“Players are prohibited from profiting off their image or reputation,
including the selling of merchandise and autographs. Players are also
required to sign a release permitting the Employer and the Big Ten

WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2014, 12:05 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052702303325204579463650558954652; Letter
to the Editor, Student, Athlete and Employee?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/05/opinion/student-athlete-and-employee.html; cf. Killion,
supra note 114.
114. See Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the Consequences of Unionizing
Student Athletes, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 113th Cong. (2014).
115. See generally CHARLES P. KORR, THE END OF BASEBALL AS WE KNEW IT: THE
PLAYERS UNION, 1960-1981 (2002); cf. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL:
LABOR RELATIONS IN AN AGE OF PROSPEROUS TURMOIL (2011); ROBERT C. BERRY, WILLIAM
B. GOULD IV & PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (1986).
116. E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 104.204 (2012); cf. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1
(1957).
117. See, e.g., Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111 (“The Employer reported to
the Department of Education that its football team generated total revenues of $235 million and
incurred total expenses of $159 million between 2003 and 2012. For the 2012-2013 academic
year, the Employer reported that its football program generated $30.1 million in revenue and
$21.7 million in expenses.”); see also Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs:
A Legal Blueprint to Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1003, 1003-1009
(2012); Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete:
The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 73-80 (2006).
118. E.g., Joe Nocera, Opinion, A Step Toward Justice in College Sports?, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/opinion/nocera-a-step-toward-justice-incollege-sports.html; Joe Nocera, Opinion, Unionized College Athletes?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/opinion/nocera-unionized-college-athletes.html; Joe
Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-collegeathletes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/theshame-of-college-sports/308643/.
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Conference to utilize their name, likeness and image for any purpose.”119
As the New Yorker recently observed:
The rationale for the players’ demands, which include
concussion-testing, extended medical coverage, and more
manageable practice schedules, is based on a real inequity.
Football makes lots of money for schools—Northwestern
says that between 2003 and 2012 it made two hundred and
thirty-five million dollars in football revenue, including
lucrative TV deals—and the thought is that those who
create the value ought to share in it, particularly since a
sports scholarship, instead of being a guarantee of four
years of free education, often lasts only as long as the
player is producing. The union vote is a subset, in turn, of
a larger, much talked-of move to pay student players to
play sports. This, too, sounds reasonable. Nick Saban, the
head coach at the University of Alabama, makes around
seven million dollars a season; shouldn’t those who do the
work share the wealth? 120
It is no longer a Frank Merriwell-type relationship, 121 where
competition was part-time and subordinated to full-time university student
commitment. Today, as the Regional Director found with regard to
Northwestern University:
[T]he Employer’s scholarship players are identified and
recruited in the first instance because of their football
prowess and not because of their academic achievement in
high school. Only after the Employer’s football program
becomes interested in a high school player based on the
119. Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111. But see Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW (N.D. Cal., Aug. 8, 2014)
(holding this conduct to be a violation of antitrust law).
120. Adam Gopnik, Team Spirit, THE NEW YORKER (May 12, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/12/team-spirit-4. Cf. Associated Press, Donovan,
Calipari in Bonus Duel at Final Four, USA TODAY (Apr. 4, 2014, 7:39 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2014/04/04/donovan-calipari-in-bonus-duel-at-finalfour/7322283 (discussing six-figure bonuses that top college basketball coaches make for
tournament success).
121. See BURT L. STANDISH, FRANK MERRIWELL’S LIMIT 1-28 (Tip-Top Weekly, Jan. 6,
1900); BURT L. STANDISH, FRANK MERRIWELL AT YALE (Street & Smith 1903); THE
ADVENTURES OF FRANK MERRIWELL (Universal Pictures 1936).
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potential benefit he might add to the Employer’s football
program does the potential candidate get vetted through the
Employer’s recruiting and admissions process. 122
A number of the athletic programs, particularly large-revenue
producing football and basketball,123 as well as low-revenue baseball, 124
have morphed into a kind of minor league 125 that historically, even on the
professional level, have been without protection. 126
A symbiotic
relationship between the professional leagues, such as the National Football
League and the National Basketball Association (as well as the leagues in
baseball and hockey), is one in which the farm team or training costs are
reduced for the small group that advances to major league status.127 There
122. Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111.
123. William B. Gould IV, Bargaining, Race, and Globalization: How Baseball and
Other Sports Mirror Collective Bargaining, Law, and Life, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013).
124. Id. Whereas Division I football teams are allotted eighty-five full-time scholarships,
comparable baseball teams are limited to a mere 11.7 scholarships to disperse across the entire
team, and individual players rarely receive full scholarships. See Bob Nightengale, MLB Hopes to
Invigorate African-American Participation, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2013, 3:24 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
mlb/2013/04/10/mlb-bud-selig-creates-diversity-task-force/2071305; Gregory Ruehlmann, The
Incredibly White College World Series, THE ROOT (June 20, 2008, 12:00 AM),
http://www.theroot.com/views/incredibly-white-college-world-series.
125. Gopnik, supra note 120 (“The N.F.L. and the N.B.A., which profit indecently from
the free development of talent provided by colleges, need to start their own minor leagues, and
the colleges should threaten non-participation in events like the draft in order to pressure them to
do so.”). But the leagues are unlikely to do so at present, because of the enormous revenues that
they received in the context of this relationship. Similarly, the colleges will not be likely to alter
the status quo given the fact that they profit from the symbiotic connection with the professional
leagues and the prospect that their leading players will emerge as outstanding pros.
126. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Triple-A Baseball Club
Assocs. v. Ne. Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1987). But see David M. Szuchman, Note,
Step Up to the Bargaining Table: A Call for the Unionization of Minor League Baseball, 14
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 265, 299-303 (1996) (discussing the unionization of the professional
hockey minor leagues). Recently, former minor league baseball players filed a class action in
federal court claiming systematic violations of federal and state wage and hour laws. See
Complaint for Violations of Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws, Senne v. Office of the
Comm’r of Baseball, No. 3:14CV00608 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2014), 2014 WL 545501.
127. See e.g., David Lariviere, New Pro Football Launch May Eventually Serve as NFL’s
D League, FORBES (May 7, 2014, 10:07 AM)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidlariviere/2014/05/07/new-pro-football-launch-may-eventuallyserve-as-nfls-d-league/; Tom Ziller, Is the NBA D-League Almost a Real Minor League?, SB
NATION (Aug. 8, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/nba/2013/8/8/4601398/nbadleague-expansion-minor-league; Lily Rothman, Emancipation of the Minors, SLATE (Apr. 3,
2012, 11:08 AM),
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has been considerable litigation about controls imposed upon applicants
and the timing of their entry to professional status.128 Deeply intertwined
with this process is the issue of race, both football and basketball
possessing a disproportionately high percentage of black American players,
many or most of whom will not graduate from the university or establish
themselves in the major leagues. 129
The idea of unions in so-called amateur athletics seems
revolutionary. Yet only half a century ago, unions did not exist in
professional sports. Now, all of the major leagues in all major sports are
organized by unions—a phenomenon acquiesced in by professional league
owners out of fear of antitrust liability in all sports except baseball.130
B. The Legal Framework
Two overriding lines of authority intersect here. The first, from
which colleges and universities take some comfort, is the reticence
displayed by the Supreme Court in addressing university employment
relationships on the same basis as commercial enterprises.131 Though the
Board, reversing itself, has exercised jurisdiction over universities,132 and
though public-employment labor-relations statutes have covered
(sometimes explicitly or through separate statute133) higher education, the
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2012/04/minor_league_union_thousands_of_pro_
baseball_players_make_just_1_100_per_month_where_is_their_c_sar_ch_vez_.html; Adam
Fusfeld, Minor League Hockey Team Thinks NHL Affiliate Is Hurting Its Profits, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Nov. 1, 2010, 2:48 PM) http://www.businessinsider.com/a-minor-league-hockey-teamthinks-its-nhl-affiliate-is-draining-profits-2010-11.
128. Cf. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); Clarett v. Nat’l
Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005); Wood v. Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
129. See Gould, supra note 123, at 8-11.
130. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); Radovich v. Nat’l Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969); cf.
Federal Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972). See generally William B. Gould IV, Labor Issues in Professional Sports: Reflections on
Baseball, Labor, and Antitrust Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61 (2004).
131. See e.g., Brown, 518 U.S. 231; Flood, 407 U.S. 258; Radovich, 352 U.S. 445;
Toolson, 346 U.S. 356; Federal Baseball Club of Balt., Inc., 259 U.S. 200.
132. See Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
133. E.g., Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act of 1978; CAL. GOV.
CODE §§ 3560-3599 (West 2013).
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Court’s landmark Yeshiva decision 134—where it said that the “principles
developed for the industrial setting cannot be ‘imposed blindly on the
academic world’” 135—expresses caution. Closely related to this is the line
of Board authority that seems to have treated student-employees differently
from other employees because they are students. 136 This was illustrated
most recently by the Board’s decision in Brown University, 137 relied upon
by the universities in connection with unionization of athletes, holding that
graduate teaching assistants are not employees given the fact that their
work is so closely connected to the educational mission of the university. 138
But this has run up against the broad characterization of the word
“employee” within the meaning of the NLRA provided by a unanimous
Supreme Court in the 1990s. 139 There, the Court endorsed the common law
definition of employee, and held that an employee is a person who
performs services for another under contract of hire subject to the other’s
control or right of control in return for benefit or payment. 140 Except for
truly volunteer employer-employee relationships, 141 or temporary
employees who have a certain date for termination,142 such individuals are
134. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
135. Id. at 681 (quoting Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973)).
136. E.g., S.F. Art Inst., 226 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1251 (1976); Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
214 N.L.R.B. 621, 621 (1974); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972).
137. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (2004). This decision reversed New York
University, 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1209 (2000). Subsequently, the Board appeared to express
disagreement with Brown University by granting a petition for review in New York University,
356 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (2010), but the union withdrew its petition and negotiated a collective
bargaining agreement with the university subsequent to obtaining majority status through a
privately conducted process.
138. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487 (“It is clear to us that graduate student assistants,
including those at Brown, are primarily students and have a primarily educational, not economic,
relationship with their university.”).
139. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1995).
140. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 90-92 (“The ordinary dictionary definition
of ‘employee’ includes any ‘person who works for another in return for financial or other
compensation.’ . . . The phrasing of the Act seems to reiterate the breadth of the ordinary
dictionary definition . . . [and] literal interpretation of the word ‘employee’ is consistent with
several of the Act’s purposes.”).
141. E.g., WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1276 (1999).
142. E.g., MJM Studios of N.Y., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 1255, 1257-58 (2001) (discussing
“date certain” test for temporary-employee status). Cf. Personal Prods. Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 959,
960-961 (1955).

FULL COURT PRESS (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

7/2/2015 1:53 PM

FULL COURT PRESS

31

employees. For instance, the Board has held that medical interns in a threeto seven-year residency program are employees. 143 Thus, the key test is
whether there is both benefit and control.
Athletic scholarship players at Northwestern—on the football team
there are 85 of 112 who fit within that category and thus are part of the
appropriate bargaining unit for the purposes of the NLRA—have received
approximately $61,000 per academic year in a grant of aid. 144 Clearly this
is a benefit, though when considered against the poverty line, and the fact
that revenue sharing at the professional level would at least double this
amount, it is relatively small. A recent standout in the NCAA tournament
contended that his scholarship left him at times going to bed hungry at
night. 145 But it is a benefit nonetheless for the purpose of the common law
test adopted by the Supreme Court.
Of course, in addition to benefits, security is also important, and
although the scholarships were year-to-year and, under NCAA rules as of
two years ago, predicated upon athletic performance and not academics,
colleges are now permitted to provide multi-year awards. Though
Northwestern provides a four-year scholarship with an option for a fifth
year, the Chronicle of Higher Education found that relatively few Division
I public universities do so for more than a “handful of athletes.” 146 At the
wealthiest programs, new “entitlements” for young athletes are decried, and
the University of Texas at Austin, University of Oregon, Texas A&M,
University of Arizona, Georgia Tech, and University of Louisville have a
very small number of multi-year awards. 147 Of course, in basketball there
is the notorious “one and done,” i.e. the advance of players to the NBA
after just one year at the university. 148 There was considerable resistance
143. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 166 (1999).
144. Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111. In general, qualified scholarships are
exempt from taxable gross income. 26 U.S.C. § 117 (2012). There is an exception for
scholarships that represent “payment for teaching, research, or other services by the student
required as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarship,” 26 U.S.C. § 117(c)(1) (2012), yet
the IRS has never interpreted athletic scholarships as falling within this category.
145. Soraya Nadia McDonald, National Champ U-Conn.’s Napier Says He Goes to Bed
Starving, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2014/04/08/national-champ-uconns-napier-says-he-goes-to-bed-starving.
146. Brad Wolverton & Jonah Newman, Few Athletes Benefit from Move to Multiyear
Scholarships, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 19, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/FewAthletes-Benefit-From-Move/138643/.
147. Id.
148. NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, December 2011, Art. X, § 1(b)(i) available
at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2011; see Alex Berg, Opinion, Viewpoint: One and Done Rule Bad
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and a near repeal of the new rule: “[s]everal Southeastern Conference
institutions—including Louisiana State University, the University of
Tennessee, and Texas A&M University—are largely opposed to the
multiyear approach. 149 But some of the league’s teams have used multiyear
awards when necessary to land recruits.” 150 The multi-year agreement
provides the athletes, whom the universities claim are being recruited as
student-athletes, to remain in the university even when their skills either
decline, do not realize promise, or cannot be utilized because of injury. 151
Meanwhile, the controls are considerable. In order to obtain
outside employment at Northwestern, for instance, permission must be
obtained from the athletic department. 152 Only media interviews arranged
by the athletic department are allowed.153 Restrictions are imposed upon
online postings. 154 The players are subject to a strict drug and alcohol
policy, 155 and a dress code is in effect. 156 During the first two years,
players must live in on-campus dormitories, and upperclassmen must
submit their lease to the coach for approval.157
Beginning the first week in August, there is a month-long training
camp 158 and summer workouts conducted by strength and conditioning
coaches can take up to twenty-five hours per week. 159 Though the rules
only permit four hours of practice per day, 160 other drills are held outside

for Athletes, USA TODAY (June 27, 2012), http://college.usatoday.com/2012/06/27/opinion-oneand-done-rule-bad-for-athletes/.
149. Wolverton & Newman, supra note 146.
150. Id.
151. Cf. Id.
152. Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111, at 4.
153. Id. 5.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 16.
157. Id. at 3.
158. Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111, at 5.
159. Id. at 8-9.
160. Id. at 6.
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the presence of coaches, 161 and players go to the coaches’ offices in the
evening for a couple of hours of game-film watching. 162 During the regular
football season, the players are involved with the program for at least forty
to fifty hours per week. 163
C. The Education Defense
The principal defense of the universities and colleges is that
athletes are not employees within the meaning of the NLRA, since Brown
University held that teaching assistants are not employees inasmuch as they
are “primarily” involved in an educational enterprise.164 But as the
Regional Director found, the same cannot be said of football players who
are supervised by non-academic coaches,165 in contrast to graduate students
who are under the tutelage of professors. 166 Moreover, as the Board itself
noted, the Brown University doctrine is problematic because involvement
with the educational enterprise and professors ought not remove individuals
from employee status.167
Again, Yeshiva has noted that universities are different.168 But to
the extent that issues in collective bargaining may involve grades or class
hours or academics, the answer is not for the Board to refuse to assert
jurisdiction, but rather to hold that such subject matter is non-mandatory

161. Id. at 6-7.
162. Id. at 7.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B. at 488.
165. Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111, at 19.
166. Id. at 18.
167. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 117, at 121 (“At the outset, it bears
remembering that the Board in Brown did not foreclose graduate student assistants from
employee status solely because they were students. That is, the Board did not rule in Brown that
students and employees are two mutually exclusive categories.”); Id. at 121-28 (distinguishing
Brown from the student-athlete context on the grounds that athletes play a limited role as
students, that athletic participation does not contribute to education, that athletes are supervised
by coaching staff instead of faculty, and that athletic scholarships are compensation for athletic
services and not merely financial aid).
168. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 680-81.
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within the meaning of the NLRA under First National Maintenance 169 and
its progeny. 170
The Board, for instance, has taken jurisdiction over government
contractors even though the contracts that they enter into with the
government are beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRA and the Board and
may preclude collective bargaining over many issues. 171 Sometimes the
Board has stressed the proposition that “most, if not all, matters relating to
the employment relationship” are to be controlled by the entity that is in a
relationship with the government. 172 In the landmark Management
Training case, the Board held that the employer must “control some
matters relating to the employment relationship” in order to be an employer
within the meaning of the NLRA. 173 When disputes arise, again, the
fundamental concern ought to be where the duty of bargain parameters lies,
rather than jurisdiction itself. 174 Thus, though some issues may be
controlled by the NCAA or by public employers beyond the jurisdiction of
the statute, the employer may be able to address some subject matter at the
bargaining table.
Similarly, even though editorial matters are beyond the collective
bargaining process by virtue of the First Amendment, the Board has
asserted jurisdiction over newspapers. 175
In education itself,
notwithstanding the issues relating to freedom of religion or freedom of
speech, 176 the Board nonetheless asserts jurisdiction over education in the
169. First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-675 (1981); see also William
B. Gould, The Supreme Court’s Labor and Employment Docket in the 1980 Term: Justice
Brennan’s Term, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 6-17 (1981).
170. E.g., NLRB v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 432 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2005); Dubuque Packing
Co., Inc., 303 N.L.R.B. 386 (1991). cf. Q-1 Motor Exp., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 767, 769 (1997)
(Chairman Gould Concurring).
171. The circuit courts have uniformly supported the Board’s holdings. See, e.g.,
Aramark Corp. v. NLRB, 179 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 1999); Pikeville United Methodist Hosp. of
Kentucky v. United Steelworkers of Am., 109 F.3d 1146 (6th Cir. 1997); Teledyne Econ. Dev. v.
NLRB, 108 F.3d 56 (4th Cir. 1997); NLRB v. Fed. Sec., Inc., 154 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 1998).
172. Chicago Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (Dec.
14, 2012); see also Recana Solutions, 349 N.L.R.B. 1163 (2007).
173. Mgmt. Training Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1355, 1358 (1995).
174. See id. at 1357 (“Nor should the Board be deciding as a jurisdictional question which
terms and conditions of employment are or are not essential to the bargaining process.”).
175. See, e.g., Ampersand Publ’g, LLC v. NLRB, 702 F.3d 51 (2012); Ampersand
Publ’g, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (May 31, 2013).
176. Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).

FULL COURT PRESS (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

7/2/2015 1:53 PM

FULL COURT PRESS

35

private sector. 177 This all illustrates that, regardless of the sincerity of
concerns about the integrity of universities’ educational missions, the mere
assertion of jurisdiction by the Board does not necessitate bargaining
between athletes and the university over education-related issues. The
Board has the ability to except certain issues from the status of mandatory
bargaining subjects—and need not avoid the issue entirely by declining to
assert jurisdiction over college athletes as “employees.”
D. Implications for Federal and State Taxation of College Athletes
In addition to misplaced cries about the sanctity of education and
the need to preserve the student-school relationship discussed above, critics
of unionization have also warned of increased taxation of college athlete
“employees” if the Regional Director’s decision is upheld.178 However,
decisions by the Board have no legal force on the federal or state agencies
that administer the separate statutes governing taxation and other
employee-benefit issues, and thus there is no clear causal relationship that
would lead to new taxation. 179 Contrary to some popular perceptions, the
177. E.g., Chicago Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41;
Windsor Sch., 200 N.L.R.B. 991 (1972).
178. E.g., Darren Rovell, Players Could Get Big Tax Bill, ESPN (Mar. 27, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10683398/tax-implications-create-hurdle-playersunion; Alejandro Cancino, Northwestern Ruling Could Lead Athletes Paying Taxes on
Scholarships, CHIC. TRIB. (Mar. 28, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-0328/business/chi-northwestern-union-taxes-20140327_1_athletic-scholarships-football-playersstate-taxes; Paul Caron, Northwestern Athletes May Face Big Tax Hit From Unionization Victory,
TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 28, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/03/northwesternathletes.html; Kevin Trahan, Clarity Sought as Northwestern Football’s Labor Effort Evolves,
USA TODAY (Mar. 31, 2014, 2:43 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/03/31/college-football-ncpa-capa-nlrb-chicagonorthwestern-labor-union/7077455/.
179. E.g., Paseiro v. C.I.R., 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1432, 1435 (1977) (“Contrary to the
contention of the petitioner, a ruling by the National Labor Relations Board that hospital residents
are students rather than employees under the National Labor Relations Act does not determine the
proper classification of petitioner under [the Internal Revenue Code].”); see also Woodling v.
C.I.R., 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1766, 1767-68 (1976) (“Whatever [the Cedars-Sinai decision’s] effect
in other areas, such a determination is in no way binding on us in construing the tax laws.”); Bretz
v. C.I.R., 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 278 (1978) (“[T]he classification or definition as an employee under
the labor laws is not controlling in tax cases . . . .”); Hales v. C.I.R., 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 946 (1978)
(“Petitioner’s student analogy to the decision of the NLRB that certain hospital interns and
residents are not employees for collective bargaining purposes is also inapposite.”); Tsou v.
C.I.R., 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 56, 59 (1980) (“[T]he findings of the NLRB . . . have no bearing upon
the tax issue here involved.”); Saber v. C.I.R., 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 945, 948 (1981) (“[P]etitioner’s
contention that rulings by the National Labor Relations Board that medical residents are students
should control our decision is without merit.”).
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fact that college athletes might possess a federal right to unionize does not
mean they will suddenly be receiving taxable wages, or that the Internal
Revenue Service will suddenly reverse decades of countervailing precedent
in order to tax them. 180
In the late 1970s, the Board determined that medical-student
interns, residents, and clinical fellows were not statutory “employees”
within the meaning of the NLRA. 181 As one might expect, this decision
fostered a host of challenges by interns and residents who sought to have
their earnings from such positions—which primarily came in the form of
grants and stipends 182—excluded from their taxable income inasmuch as
they were not “employees.” However, both the IRS and the U.S. Tax Court
consistently rejected these challenges on the grounds that the definition of
“employee” under federal labor law is distinct from the definition of
“employee” under federal tax law.183 In a formal Revenue Ruling, the IRS
stated that: “The standards used for determining whether individuals are
employees for purposes of labor relations are not the same as those used for
purposes of Federal taxation.” 184 Indeed, the IRS only felt the need to
clarify the issue in the first place “so that the public will not erroneously
rely on the Board’s decision . . . .” 185
180. E.g., Paseiro v. C.I.R., 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1435 ; see also Woodling v. C.I.R., 35
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1767-68; Bretz v. C.I.R., 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 278; Hales v. C.I.R., 37 T.C.M.
(CCH) 946; Tsou v. C.I.R., 40 T.C.M. (CCH) at 59 (1980); Saber v. C.I.R., 42 T.C.M. (CCH) at
948 (1981).
181. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976); see also St. Clare’s Hosp. &
Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977). These decisions were overruled twenty years later by
Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, and medical-student residents and interns continue to
be recognized as statutory employees even after Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B. 483. See Brown
University, 342 N.L.R.B. at 494 n.5 (2004) (declining to overrule Boston Medical).
182. In the context of scholarship athletes, two distinct interpretations of the Internal
Revenue Code seem relevant: first, whether such athletes are “employees” within the meaning of
the statute; and second, whether the athletic scholarships themselves fall within the exception to
non-taxable qualified scholarships contained in 26 U.S.C. § 117 (2012). However, the right-tocontrol inquiry under the common-law test for employee status—see, e.g., Blodgett v. C.I.R., 104
T.C.M. 500 (2012)—and the inquiry into whether the scholarships are “payment for . . . services
by the student required as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarships,” 26 U.S.C.
§ 117(c)(1), appear to substantially overlap for purposes of the present analysis.
183. E.g., Paseiro v. C.I.R., 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1435 ; see also Woodling v. C.I.R., 35
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1767-68; Bretz v. C.I.R., 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 278; Hales v. C.I.R., 37 T.C.M.
(CCH) 946; Tsou v. C.I.R., 40 T.C.M. (CCH) at 59 (1980); Saber v. C.I.R., 42 T.C.M. (CCH) at
948 (1981).
184. Rev. Rul. 78-54, 1978-1 C.B. 36.
185. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,277 (Sept. 29, 1977).
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Although these rulings rejecting a direct equivalence between an
individual’s status for tax purposes and his or her status under other federal
statutory regimes have a long historical precedent, 186 one could argue that
their continued validity might be questioned to the extent that they relied
on older Supreme Court opinions endorsing a functionalist approach to
employee status under federal law. 187 In the 1990s, the Court gestured
toward a more uniform application of common-law principles in
determining employee status. 188 However, as noted previously, in the
1990s the Court also recognized a broad conception of employee status
under the NLRA in NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc. 189 In that case,
the Court distinguished between decisions by courts interpreting an
ambiguous federal statute—in which case the presumption of common-law
agency doctrine prevails—and decisions by the Board interpreting the
NLRA, in which case the “Board’s construction of [the term ‘employee’] is
entitled to considerable deference,” unless the Board departs so far from
the common-law doctrine so as to “render[] its interpretation
unreasonable.” 190
Thus, there remains substantial latitude between Board decisions
regarding employee status for the purposes of federal labor law, 191 and
employee status under other statutory regimes—including federal tax
186. See, e.g., Loo v. C.I.R., 22 T.C. 220, 224-25 (1954) (holding that petitioner’s status
under federal immigration law as determined by the Immigration and Naturalization Service was
irrelevant for the purposes of determining the classification of income for taxation purposes);
Guaranty State Bank of Greenville, Tex. v. C.I.R., 12 B.T.A. 543, 547 (1928) (holding that
findings of Texas Banking Commissioner were not binding and were “without any probative
force”).
187. E.g., Rev. Rul. 78-54, 1978-1 C.B. 36 (citing United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704
(1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 136-37 (1944). But see I.R.S. Information
Letter 2014-0016, 2014 WL 2958209 (June 27, 2014) (noting that the IRS has reaffirmed the fact
that “employee” status for labor law purposes does not control “employee” status for purposes of
the Internal Revenue Code in the wake of the Northwestern decision).
188. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992) (adopting the
common-law definition of “employee” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and
dismissing Hearst and Silk as “feeble precedents for unmooring the term from the common
law.”).
189. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85.
190. Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
191. Cf., e.g., Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967) (discharged employee);
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (job applicants). The Board also declines
jurisdiction over workers who are likely “employees” for tax purposes, such as certain temporary
employees. Cf. MJM Studios of N.Y., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. at 1257-58; Personal Prods. Corp., 114
N.L.R.B. at 960-62.
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law. 192 The Board often resorts to the explicit common-law test, but the
Board nonetheless retains broader discretion to determine the bounds of the
NLRA. 193 Indeed, the very issue before the Board in reviewing
Northwestern’s appeal of the Regional Director’s decision—whether
scholarship athletes are excluded as statutory “employees” because they are
“primarily students” under the Brown University test—arises from a prior
Board decision determining employee status beyond the common-law test
alone. 194 And since there is still considerable variation between the
policies underlying employee status for federal labor law versus federal tax
law, there remains no justification for the IRS to base its interpretation of
the Internal Revenue Code on the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA. The
IRS itself has recently reaffirmed this position in response to an inquiry
from Senator Richard Burr regarding the Northwestern case, and has
signaled its intention to adhere to existing IRS precedent regarding the tax
treatment of athletic scholarships.195 According to a June 2014 IRS
Information Letter, and consistent with the precedent discussed above,
“whether an individual is treated as an employee for labor law purposes is
not controlling of whether the individual is an employee for federal tax
purposes.” 196
The lack of equivalence regarding employee status extends both
ways, and the Board and courts reviewing Board decisions have no greater
192. Cf. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2634-36, 2638 (2014) (examining employee
status at the state level and recognizing the varying policy considerations that attach to the
distinction between “full-fledged state employees” who are treated as covered employees in a
wide range of contexts, and workers who are covered “employees” within the meaning of a single
statute or statutory provision—such as the definition of homecare personal assistants as “public
employees” solely for collective bargaining purposes under the Illinois Public Labor Relations
Act).
193. Cf., e.g., Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967) (discharged employee);
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (job applicants). The Board also declines
jurisdiction over workers who are likely “employees” for tax purposes, such as certain temporary
employees. Cf. MJM Studios of N.Y., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. at 1257-58; Personal Prods. Corp., 114
N.L.R.B. at 960-62.
194. See, e.g., Br. to the Regional Director on Behalf of Northwestern University 51, Mar.
17, 2014, ECF No. 13-RC-121359 (“As the [Brown University] Board explained, even assuming
arguendo that students are employees under a common law definition, ‘it does not follow that
they are employees within the meaning of the Act.’” (citation omitted)); Br. to the Regional
Director on Behalf of Northwestern University 52, Mar. 17, 2014, ECF No. 13-RC-121359
(“[C]ommon law agency principles cannot be forced onto the enrolled student who engages in
voluntary co-curricular activities.”).
195. I.R.S. Information Letter 2014-0016, 2014 WL 2958209 (June 27, 2014).
196. Id.
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basis for relying on decisions by the IRS. 197 This is true not only in the
context of employee status, but also in the context of classifying
employees’ compensation—for example, courts have endorsed the Board’s
inclusion of unreported tips in calculating back pay awards, despite the fact
that employees paid no taxes on such income. 198 Similarly, the fact that an
employer did not consider individuals to be “employees” for the purposes
of tax withholdings and other deductions has no bearing on whether those
individuals are “employees” within the meaning of the NLRA. 199 These
examples all demonstrate that, at the very least, the IRS certainly has no
obligation to modify its long-standing policy of excluding college athletes
from taxation simply because the Board has granted such athletes the
protections of the NLRA.
The more complicated question is whether tax agencies—at least at
the state level—even can base a change in tax policy on the resolution of
the Northwestern players’ election petition. In addition to the threat of
federal taxation, another main source of worry for college athletes might be
taxation at the state level.200 However, while the above discussion of the
relationship between the IRS and Board decisions is not directly applicable
in the state context, there may be an even greater obstacle to state reliance
on a Board determination that scholarships athletes are “employees”
covered by the NLRA: federal preemption.201 States are generally granted
197. See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 511 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(“It is to the precedents of the Board, and not to those of the Internal Revenue Service, that we
owe deference, as only the former is charged with enforcing the provisions of the NLRA.”);
Truman Med. Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 570, 573 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[R]ulings of the
Internal Revenue Service are not determinative of the meaning of the section 2(2) exemption for
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act.”); Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v.
NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
198. E.g., Atl. Limousine, Inc. v. NLRB, 243 F.3d 711, 717-18, 719 (3d Cir. 2001);
NLRB v. Lee Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1347, 1347 (9th Cir. 1994).
199. See Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 763-64, n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2002); NLRB v.
Amber Delivery Serv., Inc., 651 F.2d 57, 61-62 (1st Cir. 1981); J. Huizinga Cartage Co. v.
NLRB, 941 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1991); NLRB v. Keystone Floors, Inc., 306 F.2d 560, 561,
563 (3d Cir. 1962). But see I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 200948042, 2009 WL 4092540 (Nov. 27,
2009) (suggesting that NLRB Regional Director’s conclusion that workers were not common-law
employees could constitute a “reasonable basis” for employer to rely on such conclusion in
having mistakenly not treated workers as employees for tax purposes).
200. E.g., Rovell, supra note 178; Cancino, supra note 178; Caron, supra note 178;
Trahan, supra note 178.
201. See Bo Newsome, Are Scholarship Athletes Employees? NLRB Ruling Prompts
House Hearing, NAT’L ASS’N. OF INDEP. COLLS. & UNIVS. (May 19, 2014)
http://www.naicu.edu/news_room/news_detail.asp?id=20362.
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broad freedom against federal interference in the collection of taxes,202 but
here the hypothetical is that state agencies would base a reconsideration of
college athletes’ tax status on a determination by the Board made in the
context of a union representation petition. In other words, a change in
policy on the state level triggered by the Board’s decision would make the
Northwestern players newly liable for taxation as a direct result of their
having petitioned the Board for a representation election and their having
pursued a claim of employee status before the Board.203
There is a plausible argument that any state decision triggered by
the Board’s resolution of the Northwestern case would be unconstitutional
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 204 based on the
theory that such a decision would constitute interference with a field
preempted by federal law. The NLRA and the federal law of labor
relations give rise to an expansive doctrine of preemption.205 This doctrine
encompasses the understanding that states must sometimes cede authority
in order to preserve the federal scheme for labor relations, 206 as well as the
understanding that a state’s withholding or granting of certain benefits
under state law can unduly interfere with the federal scheme. 207 A state
decision to base its reconsideration of individuals’ tax status on Board
proceedings might constitute just such undue interference.
In Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, the Supreme Court was
faced with a similar preemption issue. 208 In that case, a Florida agency had
interpreted the state’s unemployment compensation statute such that

202. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 344 (1989) (“The
States . . . have broad powers to impose and collect taxes.”). But see, e.g., Davis v. Mich. Dep’t
of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 810-11 (1989) (discussing the holding in McCulloch v. Maryland).
203. See Newsome, supra note 201.
204. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
205. See Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp’t
Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 136-55 n.3 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 236, 244 (1959); see also William B. Gould, The Garmon Case: Decline
and Threshold of Litigating Elucidation, 39 U. DET. MERCY L.J. 539, 539-40 (1962).
206. E.g., NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971) (holding that the Board
has implied authority to seek federal injunctions against state court orders interfering with the
administration of federal labor law).
207. E.g., Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282,
287 (1986) (holding that state law preventing employers with multiple unfair labor practice
violations from receiving government contracts was preempted).
208. Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n 389 U.S. 235, 236--38 (1967).
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individuals, like the petitioner, who filed unfair labor practice charges with
the Board would be excluded from receiving unemployment benefits while
the charges were still pending. 209 The Court held that the state decision
was a coercive deterrent to individuals filing charges with the Board, and
therefore was preempted by the NLRA. 210 According to the Court:
“Florida should not be permitted to defeat or handicap a valid national
objective by threatening to withdraw state benefits from persons simply
because they cooperate with the Government’s constitutional plan.”211
Much like the state decision at issue in Nash, if a state agency
bases its reconsideration of whether to tax college athletes on those
athletes’ successful petition to the Board, the “financial burden . . .
impose[d] will impede resort to the [NLRA] and thwart congressional
reliance on individual action.” 212 Quite simply, if individual workers or
classes of workers learn that petitioning the Board for employee status or
for a union-representation election might cause them to become newly
liable for state taxation, such workers will be faced with an “unappetizing
choice” 213 between either federal labor protections or continued tax-free
status, and thus will be less willing to enforce their rights under federal law.
Furthermore, the intrusion of state tax determinations would disrupt the
goal of the NLRA in securing the “‘uniform application’ of its substantive
rules and [in avoiding] the ‘diversities and conflicts likely to result from a
variety of local procedures and attitudes . . . . ‘“ 214 Decisions by individual
states that proceedings before the Board can serve as legitimate grounds for
reconsidering individuals’ state tax obligations would create a national

209. Id. at 236-37 (the agency determined that filing charges with the Board created an
ongoing “‘labor dispute’” within the definition of the state statute).
210. Id. at 239.
211. Id.
212. Id.; see also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 117-18 (1994) (finding state
decision, which waived state wage-payment penalties against employers for employees covered
by certain collective-bargaining agreements, to be preempted by the NLRA: “[T]he [state
official] has presented Livadas and others like her with the choice of having state-law rights under
§§ 201 and 203 enforced or exercising the right to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement
with an arbitration clause . . . . This unappetizing choice, we conclude, . . . cannot ultimately be
reconciled with a statutory scheme premised on the centrality of the right to bargain collectively
. . . .”).
213. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 117.
214. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971) (quoting Garner v. Teamsters,
Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953)).
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patchwork whereby workers in one state are shackled with greater
deterrents to petitioning the Board than workers in an adjacent state.
Of course, as a general matter, a state determination that college
athletes are taxable employees does not automatically conflict with federal
law. 215 But states have declined to tax college athletes for decades, and it is
unclear what the justification for changing course now would be other than
the Northwestern case and the possible introduction of a union.216 The
question of whether the taxation of college athletes is permissible under
state tax statutes, which do not themselves conflict with federal law, is
fundamentally irrelevant, since “[p]re-emption analysis, rather, turns on the
actual content of [the state’s] policy and its real effect on federal rights.”217
If a state agency’s determination that college athletes are taxable is
ultimately based upon, or is a direct result of, an independent decision by
the Board in enforcing the NLRA, then the state’s actions would begin to
raise serious questions of federal preemption.
IV. POTENTIAL FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
A. Introduction
As has been demonstrated, there are numerous questions of law yet
to be answered. It remains to be seen whether a Board decision, and/or a
possible federal appeals court decision, or a U.S. Supreme Court decision
will ultimately decide on and resolve their various issues. Of course, there
also remains the possibility of a settlement, which might resolve some of
their issues. For example, a Board decision may leave open the state and
federal taxation question. However, a decision by the Board, followed by a
215. Nor, as a general matter, was Florida under any inherent obligation to provide the
petitioner in Nash with unemployment benefits. The constitutional issue arose from the nexus
between the state’s decision and the petitioner’s proceedings before the Board.
216. State policies explicitly linking differential taxation to union membership might be
more clearly preempted by section 7 of the NLRA and by San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Such direct interference with employees’ section 7 rights might
also be grounds for damages actions against state officials in their individual capacities under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The Supreme Court has recognized a section 1983 cause of action under
the NLRA. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132-34 (1994); Golden State Transit Corp.
v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989). However, in general the Court has also strongly undercut
plaintiffs’ ability to challenge the collection of state taxes, and at a minimum plaintiffs might be
required to bring a section 1983 action in state court due to the so-called Tax Anti-Injunction Act,
26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), as well as principles of comity. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate v.
McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
217. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 119 (citing Nash v. Fla. Indust. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235).
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vote in unionization and a subsequent collective bargaining agreement
between the players and the Northwestern University, may sufficiently
change the characterization of the players such that the IRS or a state taxing
agency might have the grounds to tax the players.
This section will explore the range of possible ramifications of
continued litigation success of the petitioners in Northwestern University
and/or a possible settlement in the case. This allows us to consider the
range of the potential impact, as well as the magnitude. It is important to
understand the ramifications, not only on the parties involved (CAPA,
Northwestern Football players), but also for similarly situated parties
(college football players at private universities and possibly public
universities). It is also important to understand that a shift in the dynamics,
relationship, legal status, etc. in football, because of its significant
dominance on college athletic departments, will potentially have a
significant impact on the rest of the athletic department, its sports, studentathletes, coaches and other staff, and administrators.
B. Increasing Athletic Aid to Cost of Attendance
If student-athletes are successful in reform efforts, the amount of
financial aid provided to student-athletes will likely increase, particularly
those in revenue generating sports like football and men’s basketball. One
example, especially in a settlement scenario, is increasing athletic
scholarships to the full cost of attendance 218 (unionization and subsequent
collective bargaining negotiations will likely result in greater amounts). By
NCAA mandate, “full-ride” athletic scholarships are limited to the cost of
tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related materials,219
leaving student athletics to cover personal expenses and travel from their
hometown to the university and vice versa. Consequently, full-grant in aid
scholarships approved by the NCAA do not cover the full cost to attend a
college or university as a full time student. For example, Northwestern
University estimates it will cost undergraduate students a total of $65,554
to attend the university for one year as a full time student, yet because
athletic scholarships sanctioned by the NCAA do not cover personal

218. Cost of attendance is the full and reasonable estimated cost to complete a full-year at
a college or university set by each individual academic institution and includes tuition and fees,
room and board, required course material and other personal expenses including travel. For an
example, see Cost of Attendance, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
http://undergradaid.northwestern.edu/eligibility-and-policies/financial-eligibility/cost-ofattendance.html (last visited Aug. 23).
219. 2013-2014 NCAA Division I Manual art. 15.02.5
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expenses of transportation, student athletes at Northwestern are only
eligible to receive a scholarship up to $63,589, creating a financial gap of
$1,965. 220 Similarly, the financial gap at the University of Texas is $2,159
(see Figure 9 below).
Figure 9
Cost of Attendance Gap
Northwestern University (Private) 221
Cost of
Full Grant
Attendance
in Aid
Tuition & Fees
$47,286
$47, 286
Room & Board
$14,389
$14,389
Books & Supplies
$1,914
$1,914
Personal Expenses
$1,965
Not Included
Transportation
Varies
Not Included
Total
$65,554
$63,589

Δ: $1,965

University of Texas (Austin, TX): In-State Tuition 222
Cost of
Full Grant
Attendance
in Aid
Tuition & Fees
$5,369
$5,369
Room & Board
$5,681
$5,681
Books & Supplies
$375
$375
Personal Expenses
$1,388
Not Included
Transportation
$735
Not Included
Total
$13,584
$11,425
Δ: $2,159
To manage this gap and provide the full cost of attendance to
student-athletes, member institutions will need to provide additional
funding for travel and personal expenses, and increase the amount of
scholarships currently provided to student-athletes. This cost will vary
from program to program based on the number of athletic scholarships each
athletic program currently offers, the cost of tuition and fees, room and

220. Cost of Attendance, supra note 218.
221. Id.
222. Cost of Attendance, THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN,
http://finaid.utexas.edu/costs.html (July 27, 2014).
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board, and required course materials at each institution, and the full
estimated cost of attendance established to attend those institutions.
Additionally, to remain in compliance with Title IX, 223 if an educational
institution increases the amount of aid available to male athletes (i.e.
football players) up the full cost of attendance, a proportional amount of aid
must also be provided to female athletes. 224 Therefore, increasing football
or men’s basketball scholarships up to or beyond the cost of attendance will
increase the cost to sponsor other sports within athletics program as well.
The additional costs of increasing scholarships can be estimated by
multiplying the number of athletic scholarships currently provided by the
additional cost to increase full grant-in-aids to the full cost of attendance.
For example, if an athletics program elected to increase approximately 100
scholarships (eighty-five for football and thirteen for men’s basketball),225
by $1,000 to meet the university’s full cost of attendance, the athletic
department might incur $100,000 (100 x $1,000) of additional costs.
However, to remain in compliance with Title IX, increasing scholarships
for male student-athletes may also require a boost in scholarships allocated
to female student-athletes. 226 Therefore, the athletic program may need to
actually increase almost 200 athletic scholarships up to the cost of
attendance as opposed to the initial 100 in order to provide additional aid to
both male and female athletes. Thus, the athletic program might more
accurately incur $200,000 (200 x $1000) of additional costs, significantly
increasing grant-in-aid expenses.
As stated above, the cost to increase athletic aid up to the cost of
attendance will vary at each institution depending on the number of
scholarships increased and how much value must be added to each. Figure
10 takes both of these factors into account to illustrate the potential costs of
providing an actual full-ride athletic scholarship.

223. 20 U.S.C. § 1681-87 (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2010).
224. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2010).
225. As per NCAA rules, FBS athletics programs may only furnish a maximum of eightyfive scholarships to football, thirteen to men’s basketball, and fifteen to women’s basketball.
2013-2014 NCAA Division I Manual art. 15.5.5, 15.5.6.
226.

34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2010).
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Figure 10
Cost of Increasing Scholarships (Full Grant in Aid)
Up to the Cost of Attendance

# of Scholarships

Additional Value Added to
Each Scholarship
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000

50

$50,000

$75,000

$100,000

100

$100,000

$150,000

$200,000

150

$150,000

$225,000

$300,000

200

$200,000

$300,000

$400,000

250

$250,000

$375,000

$500,000

300

$300,000

$450,000

$600,000

# of Scholarships

Additional Value Added to
Each Scholarship
$2,500
$3,000
$3,500

50

$125,000

$150,000

$175,000

100

$250,000

$300,000

$350,000

150

$375,000

$450,000

$525,000

200

$500,000

$600,000

$700,000

250

$625,000

$750,000

$875,000

300

$750,000

$900,000

$1,050,000

C. Increasing Athletic Aid Beyond Cost of Attendance
Increasing financial aid for student athletes up to the cost of
attendance is just one of the many possibilities that could arise from efforts
to reform college athletics.227 Some believe that NCAA student athletes in
227. Glenn Wong, Opinion, College Athletes Should Be Careful What They Wish For,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/03/27/scholarsplayers-and-union-members/college-athletes-should-be-careful-what-they-wish-for.
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revenue generating sports should actually be paid much more than the cost
of attendance, pointing to the millions of dollars in revenue that athletic
departments generate each year. 228 Others have proposed that student
athletes should receive a flat stipend to cover personal expenses and other
foreseeable costs. 229 Regardless, either outcome will increase costs for
athletics programs. 230 If student athletes are one day paid based on which
sports generate revenue for the university, football and men’s basketball
teams are the most likely to receive a pay day as the two highest revenuegenerating sports, which likely opens up the door to more gender equity
issues under Title IX. 231 Although, theoretically it is unclear whether
revenue based compensation would apply to entire teams or individual
players. Additionally, a flat stipend could be provided to all student
athletes within a program, to specific sports or teams, or to specific
athletes. 232 Irrespective of how it happens or why, if athletic aid for student
athletes is increased beyond the cost of attendance, the costs of sponsoring
intercollegiate athletics will soar.233 Athletic aid could be increased for
specific individuals, teams (i.e. football), sports (i.e men’s and women’s
basketball), or for entire programs (men’s and women’s). 234 Therefore, as
illustrated in Figure 11, the additional cost of increasing athletic aid will
depend on the value of the stipend or payment and the number of student
athletes receiving it.

228. Joe Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-collegeathletes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Mechelle Voepel, Title IX a Pay-for-Play Roadblock, ESPN (Jul. 15, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6769337/title-ix-seen-substantial-roadblock-payplay-college-athletics.
234. Nocera, supra note 228.
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Figure 11
Cost of Increasing Athletic Aid (Full Grant in Aid)
Beyond the Cost of Attendance

# of Student Athletes

Additional Value Added to
Each Scholarship
$5,000
$6,000
$7,000

50

$250,000

$300,000

$350,000

100

$500,000

$600,000

$700,000

200

$1,000,000

$1,200,000

$1,400,000

300

$1,500,000

$1,800,000

$2,100,000

400

$2,000,000

$2,400,000

$2,800,000

500

$2,500,000

$3,000,000

$3,500,000

600

$3,000,000

$3,600,000

$4,200,000

650

$3,250,000

$3,900,000

$4,550,000

# of Student Athletes

Additional Value Added to
Each Scholarship
$8,000
$9,000
$10,000

50

$400,000

$450,000

$500,000

100

$800,000

$900,000

$1,000,000

200

$1,600,000

$1,800,000

$2,000,000

300

$2,400,000

$2,700,000

$3,000,000

400

$3,200,000

$3,600,000

$4,000,000

500

$4,000,000

$4,500,000

$5,000,000

600

$4,800,000

$5,400,000

$6,000,000

650

$5,200,000

$ 5,850,000

$6,500,000

D. Title IX Impact
Title IX also figures to play a large role in the development of new
NCAA and athletic department policies following the conclusion of the
current litigation. “Perhaps no law has received more attention in the
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sports industry, specifically within high school and collegiate sports, than
Title IX. Forty years after its enactment, this educational statute has truly
reshaped the landscape of American sport.”235 Title IX’s impact on NCAA
activity is undisputed, and could be furthered depending on the outcome of
the Northwestern case.
Although Title IX outlaws gender discrimination in any facet of a
school that receives public funding, it is most commonly known for its
impact on amateur athletics. 236 According to Title IX, “No person shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, be treated differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated
against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics
offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics
separately on such basis.” 237
In order to prove compliance with Title IX, athletic departments
are tasked with three steps. First, they must accommodate the interests and
abilities of both male and female student-athletes. 238 To do this, a program
must be able to pass one of three tests in place.239 The most likely test that
a school will pass is the level of competitive opportunities available to both
genders by comparing proportional opportunities to the student population
demographic, while the other tests examine the department’s practice of
program expansion relative to the underrepresented gender, and determine
if the institution fully accommodates the abilities and interests of both
genders. 240
Next, schools are evaluated on the financial assistance they provide
to both male and female student athletes.241 The Office of Civil Rights
compares the scholarship dollars being spent on both genders against the

235. Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review of Forty
Legal Developments that Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 325, 325
(2012).
236. Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker: Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats Involving
Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
550, 553 (2003).
237. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2010).
238. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2010); GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW
324 (4th ed. 2010).
239. WONG, supra note 238, at 324.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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proportion of student athletes of each gender to determine if an institution
is treating both genders equally. 242 If the proportion of financial assistance
is not equal to those that compete in athletics, then a further review is
required. 243 At times, nondiscriminatory factors, including the varying
costs of different sports, as well as different values of instate versus out-ofstate tuitions can help to explain disparities.244
Finally, institutions are assessed on the level to which they provide
student athletes of both genders with equivalent benefits, opportunities, and
treatment. 245 The OCR has eleven components that are used to determine if
equal treatment is being provided, including the athletic facilities for each
sport, coaching staff, and equipment provided.246
With the potential for significant reforms within both the NCAA
and athletic department policies regarding student athletes, Title IX could
have significant financial implications for athletic departments.247 Thus, if
Northwestern is forced to recognize football student-athletes as a
bargaining unit, then it may only be a matter of time until all other NCAA
student-athletes obtain the same status.
If the outcome of the Northwestern litigation results in NCAA
football players receiving additional compensation of some form, schools
will need to act to appropriately compensate their female student-athletes in
order to maintain equality across genders.248 Regardless of whether the
additional compensation comes in the form of increasing athletic
scholarships to cover the full “cost of attendance” at a university, or other
indirect benefits received through participation in an athletic program,
athletic departments must take action to fairly compensate athletes from all
programs in order to prove Title IX compliance. 249 With very few specific
sport programs, men’s or women’s, being profitable beyond certain highlevel football and men’s basketball programs, factoring in additional costs

242. Id. at 324-325.
243. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2010).
244. WONG, supra note 238, at 325.
245. Id.
246. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c); WONG, supra note 238, at 325.
247. Wong, supra note 227.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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to every athletic department for female student athletes in order to remain
compliant with Title IX could prove particularly costly. 250
Additionally, if athletes in high profile sports like football and
men’s basketball are granted the rights to profit off their own name, image
and likeness, then the issues arise regarding how to deal with other men’s
sports, as well as women’s sports. If each student-athlete is given the rights
to his or her own name, image and likeness, then the market will determine
how much money they receive. The payment will come from third parties,
and as a result, will not fall under the purview of Title IX.251
The final legal issue will be whether men’s football and basketball
players, if they are employees, are subject to Title IX. If not, then this may
have the impact of helping men’s non-revenue sports.
E. Workers’ Compensation Impact
Workers’ compensation is a system of insurance that provides
benefits to employees that are injured or become ill on the job. 252 Workers’
compensation generally provides employees with medical care,
compensation (total or partial), disability compensation (total or partial)
and death benefits in the case of an injury or illness suffered because of
their work. 253
If student-athletes are determined by a state workers’ compensation
board to be employees of an educational institution, then the value of their
scholarships may also be determined to constitute a salary. 254 In this case,
educational institutions, as employers, may be required to provide workers’
compensation benefits for student-athletes that are injured while
250. Voepel, supra note 233.
251. James K. Gentry & Raquel M. Alexander, Pay for Women’s Basketball Coaches
Lags Far Behind That of Men’s Coaches, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/sports/ncaabasketball/pay-for-womens-basketball-coacheslags-far-behind-mens-coaches.html?pagewanted=all.
252. UTAH LABOR COMMISSION: INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS DIVISION’S EMPLOYEE’S
GUIDE TO WORKER’S COMPENSATION 2012/2013 (2012), available at
http://laborcommission.utah.gov/media/pdfs/industrialaccidents/pubs/EEGuide.pdf. [hereinafter
Utah Worker’s Compensation Guide 2012-13)
253. Id.
254. Workers’ compensation programs are administered on a state-by-state basis. New
Hampshire Workers Compensation Pamphlet, NHBAR.ORG (Mar. 2011),
https://www.nhbar.org/uploads/pdf/WorkersCompensationPamphlet.pdf. Thus, student-athletes
in some states may be considered by workers’ compensation boards to be employees of their
institution, while other student-athletes in different states may not be afforded the same status.
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participating in athletic competitions or training, unless the student-athletes
are excluded from coverage. 255
In order to be able to provide these benefits, athletic departments
must allocate funds from their operating budgets in order to pay the
insurance premiums. Alternatively, some states allow employers to selfinsure the cost of workers’ compensation. 256 Premiums for workers’
compensation are calculated by multiplying the total payroll amount by the
applicable workers’ compensation classification rate.257 For example, an
employer with a $100,000 payroll facing a .1631 classification rate for
classification will pay $16,310 in premiums ($100,000 x .1631 =
$16,310). 258
Workers’ compensation is administered on a state-by-state basis;
therefore the additional costs of providing workers’ compensation for each
institution will vary depending on the rate used by each state. Some states,
such as Florida, prohibit professional athletes from being covered under
workers’ compensation laws. 259
As the value of an athletic scholarship may be considered a
student-athlete’s salary, the payroll of a particular institution will be the
total value of the athletic scholarships it grants. For each institution, the
additional cost per athlete to provide workers’ compensation can be
estimated by multiplying the value of an athletic scholarship by the
appropriate workers’ compensation rate. To calculate the total cost of
workers’ compensation insurance at each institution, the previous figure
can be multiplied by the number of current athletic scholarships provided,
as shown in Figure 12 below.

255. Wong, supra note 227.
256. Utah Worker’s Compensation Guide 2012-13, supra note 252.
257. Premium Calculation, WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,
https://www.wcfgroup.com/premium-calculation (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
258. The .1631 figure is based on an illustrative example used by the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah in demonstrating how workers’ compensation premiums are
calculated (the actual example figure is .1641). It does not represent the actual classification rate
used to calculate workers’ compensation premiums for the University of Utah. It is used here to
illustrate the potential financial cost to an institution of beginning to pay such premiums. Id.
259. Fla. Stat. § 440.02(17)(c)3 (2013).
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Figure 12
Additional Cost of Providing
Workers’ Compensation Insurance
(Scholarship Value x WC Rate) x Number of Scholarships = Cost
# of Additional
Scholarships

$30,000 x
(.1631)

$40,000 x
(.1631)

$50,000 x
(.1631)

$60,000 x
(.1631)

$70,000
x (.1631)

50

$244,650

$326,200

$407,750

$489,300

$570,850

100

$489,300

$652,400

$815,500

$978,600

$1,141,700

150

$733,950

$978,600

$1,223,250

$1,467,900

$1,712,550

200

$978,600

$1,304,800

$1,631,000

$1,957,200

$2,283,400

250

$1,223,250

$1,631,000

$2,038,750

$2,446,500

$2,854,250

300

$1,467,900

$1,957,200

$2,446,500

$2,935,800

$3,425,100

Assume that the University of Utah currently provides fifty athletic
scholarships valued at $50,000 each. Each student-athlete receiving a
scholarship will effectively have a salary of $50,000. If the Utah workers’
compensation rate is .1631, each scholarship will cost the institution an
additional $8,155 ($50,000 x .1631) in premiums per year. Therefore, the
yearly total cost to the institution for workers’ compensation premiums for
all fifty scholarships would be $407,750.
In practice, calculating workers’ compensation costs will be much
more complicated. This is because the value of a scholarship may vary
across sports. It will also vary from student-athlete to student-athlete, as
the value of an in-state scholarship at a public institution is generally less
than the value of an out-of-state scholarship. 260
F. Unemployment Insurance Impact
Unemployment insurance is designed to provide financial
protection for certain employees. 261 As set forth by the state of New York
in the preface of the “Employer’s Guide to Unemployment Insurance,”
260. Ron Lieber, Pay for College: Services Emerge to Help Out-of-State Students Pay
In-State Tuition, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/yourmoney/paying-for-college/chasing-in-state-tuition-as-colleges-tighten-rules.html?_r=0.
261. Employer’s Guide to Unemployment Insurance, Wage Reporting, and Tax
Withholding Tax, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE (Jan. 2014),
available at http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/publications/withholding/nys50.pdf. [hereinafter New
York Employer’s Guide].
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“The New York State Unemployment Insurance Program, administered by
the State Labor Department and financed by employers, provides
immediate, short-term financial protection for people who are out of work
through no fault of their own.” 262
Unemployment insurance is determined on a state-by-state basis. 263
Therefore, the rules, regulations and interpretations will vary. If studentathletes are determined to be employees of an educational institution, the
institution may be responsible for the cost of unemployment insurance.
This issue will be handled on a state-by-state basis to determine if
student-athletes are employees for purposes of unemployment insurance.
In New York, for example, the definition of a covered employee is, “any
service, unless specifically excluded, performed for compensation under a
contract of hire.” 264
There are a number of exclusions from unemployment insurance
coverage in New York 265 and again, these exclusions will vary by state.266
If student-athletes found to be employees under the state’s
unemployment insurance laws are not excluded, then unemployment
insurance must be purchased by the employer (university athletic program).
Most state programs consider a number of factors in determining the
unemployment insurance rate. For example, in New York, factors include
the number of employees, their annual wage base, and a rate (which is the
percentage amount paid by the employer for the insurance).267 The rate
can/will also be adjusted based on the experience rating (once that is
established through time and experience).268

262. Id.
263. State Unemployment Insurance Benefits, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMINISTRATION,
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
264. New York Employer’s Guide, supra note 261.
265. Employers are not responsible for unemployment insurance contributions for, among
others: independent contractors, students, sole proprietors, free-lance reporters, licensed real
estate brokers, licensed insurance agents. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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Figure 13
Additional Cost of Providing Unemployment Insurance

Number of
StudentAthletes
100
150
200
250
300

Annual Wages
(assume $70,000
per studentathlete)
$7,000,000
$10,500,000
$14,000,000
$17,500,000
$21,000,000

1% rate

8% rate

$70,000
$105,000
$140,000
$175,000
$210,000

$560,000
$840,000
$1,120,000
$1,400,000
$1,680,000

New York’s normal range rates are 0 to 8 percent.269 So in the
figure above, if 200 student-athletes are considered employees and covered
under state statutes for unemployment benefits, then the cost to the
employer will be $140,000 to $1,120,000 based on the rate. It is important
to note that the rate can be adjusted by a subsidiary rate and an experience
rating. 270
If student-athletes are determined to be employees and are not
excluded from unemployment insurance, as Figure 13 shows, the costs may
vary considerably based on the number of student-athletes, their annual
wage and the rate. There will be some added cost, and especially with high
rates, these costs are not insignificant.
G. Income Tax Impact
As discussed earlier, it is unlikely that unionization would lead to
taxable “employee” college athletes. However, in a new world of college
athletics, the Internal Revenue Service may change its stance. So for now,
while in the “unlikely” category, here are the federal income tax
implications if a college athlete’s scholarship is considered a wage or
salary.
If the value of an athletic scholarship is considered a wage or
salary, student-athletes may be required to pay income tax based upon the
value of the scholarship 271 If colleges and universities aim to ensure that
269. Id.
270. New York Employer’s Guide, supra note 261.
271. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 755-58 (1969) (grants given to taxpayers by their
employer so that they could research and write their doctoral theses in engineering were taxable
‘compensation’, rather than excludable ‘scholarships', where there was an employer-employee
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student-athletes are made whole and that athletic scholarships cover
relevant costs, then the cost of income tax will need to be included when
determining the value of a scholarship.
For example, X University provides 100 scholarships valued at
$50,000 each. For illustrative purposes, assume that the tax on $50,000 of
income is $8,000 dollars. Also assume that the tax on $60,000 of income is
$10,000. If each student-athlete is required to pay income tax on the value
of his or her scholarship, then each scholarship would only be worth
$42,000 ($50,000- $8,000(tax)). This additional cost may mean that the
scholarship no longer covers the cost of tuition & fees, room & board, and
required course materials. Therefore, in order to offset the decrease in
scholarship value caused by the introduction of an income tax, X
University will need to increase the amount of a scholarship to $60,000.
This will ensure that the after-tax value of each scholarship remains at
$50,000 ($60,000-$10,000). Adjusting the value of a scholarship to
account for income tax paid by student-athletes will cost the university
$10,000 per scholarship, which in a department with 100 scholarships, will
cost a total of $1,000,000 per year ($10,000 x 100 scholarships).
V. CHANGES TO THE NCAA MODEL
Based on the above analysis, a median-level athletic department
will face a financial impact in the $3M to $5M range if student-athletes are
treated as employees. Of course, a settlement in the Northwestern case
means that the financial impact could fall within a much greater range,
perhaps anywhere from $0 to $5M. The question then becomes, if the
expense side of the athletic department’s budget faces an increase, how will
this be accounted for? Can FBS athletic departments afford these
additional costs, and if so, how will they be covered?
The reality is that a total of twenty (of 123) FBS athletics programs
reported positive net generated revenues (generated revenues exceed
expenses) in 2013. 272 On the contrary, a total of 103 FBS athletics
programs reported negative net generated revenues (expenses exceeded

relationship, employee benefits were continued, topics of theses were required to relate at least
generally to work of laboratory where taxpayers were employed, and employer required taxpayers
not only to hold positions with employer throughout the ‘work-study’ phase of the program, but
taxpayers were also obligated to return to employer for two years after completion of their leave).
272. Daniel L. Fulks, Revenues and Expenses: NCAA Division I Intercollegiate Athletics
Programs Report 2004-2013, NCAA 13 (Apr. 2014), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D1REVEXP2013.pdf.
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generated revenue) in 2013. 273
For those institutions that reported positive net generated revenues,
the median net generated revenue was $8,449,000.274 For those institutions
where expenses exceeded revenues, the median net deficit was
$14,904,000. 275 Thus, the financial gap between successful programs and
those with a deficit was just over $23,000,000. 276 However, for those 103
programs that reported negative net generated revenue, losses only
increased 2% over 2012, 277 after increasing almost 21% the previous
year. 278
It is important to recognize that the potential additional costs
discussed above (Title IX, unemployment insurance, workers’
compensation, income taxes) will increase the expense side of the financial
statements for each FBS institution.
The budget sizes of FBS athletic departments vary tremendously.
For example, in 2013, the University of Texas reported total expenses of
$146,807,585, while Arizona State reported total expenses of $65,600,187,
and Ohio University with reported total expenses of $27,027,550. 279
Grants-in-aid represent a significant percentage of athletic department
expenses. 280 In 2013, the median total grant-in-aid expenses for FBS
programs was $8,088,000 for public institutions and $14,014,000 for
private schools. 281
Very few institutions with positive net revenues may be able to
afford the additional costs discussed above. This is especially true of
universities and athletic departments that are self-sufficient. There are
currently seven collegiate athletic programs (Texas, Ohio State, LSU, Penn
State, Oklahoma, Nebraska, & Purdue) that are self-sufficient, meaning that

273. Id. at 28.
274. Id. at 13.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 12.
278. Fulks, supra note 272, at 28.
279. NCAA Finances, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/schools/finances/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
280. Fulks, supra note 272 at 32.
281. Id.
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the departments are not dependent upon institutional entities outside the
athletic department but most schools account for allocated expenses. 282
Beyond the twenty programs in the Power Five conferences that
reported a positive net generated revenue in 2013, the remaining 100 or so
FBS institutions will face significant financial challenges likely to have a
substantial impact on their athletic department revenues. This group of
institutions includes most of the forty-five remaining schools from the
Power Five conferences. 283 For example, the Rutgers University athletic
department received nearly $47 million in institutional funds during the
2012-13 academic year, an increase of 67.9% from the previous year.284
The University of Tennessee received an institutional subsidy of over $12.4
million in 2012-13. 285 However, it is important to note that the significant
increase in revenues is already in place for schools in the Power Five
conferences. 286 This includes television contracts and revenues from the
College Football playoff system. 287 The schools in the Power Five
conferences should clearly be able to afford significant increased benefits
to student-athletes (and this is without reducing the expense side of
significant coaching salaries for coaches and staff, as well as significant
facilities investments).288
It is clear that the next category, the non-Power Five conference
institutions might face significant and severe challenges. These schools
already rely upon a very high percentage of institutional funding (allocated
282. NCAA Finances, supra note 278 (indicated as schools that receive zero subsidy).
283. See Dennis Dodd, NCAA Proposal Would Put Power in Hands of BCS Conferences,
CBS SPORTS (Jan. 10, 2014, 12:42 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/dennisdodd/24404728/ncaa-proposal-would-put-power-in-hands-of-bcs-conferences.
284. Keith Sargeant & Steve Berkoitz, Subsidy of Rutgers Athletics Jumps 67.9% to $47
Million, USA TODAY (Feb. 23, 2014, 10:32 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/02/23/rutgers-university-athletics-subsidyjumps/5761371/.
285. NCAA Finances, supra note 279.
286. George Schroeder, Power Five’s College Football Playoff Revenues Will Double
What BCS Paid, USA TODAY (July 16, 2014, 5:57 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/07/16/college-football-playoff-financialrevenues-money-distribution-bill-hancock/12734897/; Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. May Let Top
Conferences Play by Own Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/sports/n-c-a-a-s-rich-poised-to-get-richer-with-more-athletebenefits-.html.
287. See Schroeder, supra note 286.
288. See Dodd, supra note 283.
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revenues). 289
Institutional funds represent 41.81% of the athletic
department revenues at East Carolina University, 66.24% at Ohio
University, and 65.92% at Troy University (contrast this with the
University of Michigan, an FBS institution that reported positive net
generated revenue and a 0.18% institutional subsidy). 290 Schools in this
category have already been trying to reduce institutional allocations, so
there is very little possibility of increasing revenue streams sufficiently in
order to cover increased costs.291 However, the institutions in this category
have the opportunity and ability to reduce coaching salaries or expenditures
relating to training facilities. This likely means a request for more
institutional funding, which given financial challenges in higher education
in general, will be difficult at best and probably unlikely. Some FBS
institutions rely very little on allocated revenue. For example, allocated
revenue accounts for just 0.18% of Michigan’s total athletic department
revenue. 292 Other institutions depend more heavily upon allocated
revenues in order to compete. Allocated revenue comprises 66.24% of the
total athletic department revenues at Ohio University. 293
VI. CONCLUSION
College athletics may now find itself at a crossroads similar to that
faced by professional athletics roughly a half century ago. As the
foregoing analysis makes clear, the long-term legal and economic
implications for the existing model of college athletics remain hotly
contested. There are compelling reasons to believe that the Board’s
decision regarding the eligibility of scholarship athletes to form a union
should and would have little direct impact on the viability of athletic
programs—both because certain sensitive issues, such as education, could
simply be classified as non-mandatory bargaining subjects; and because the
link between a determination of employee status under labor law and under
other areas of the law, such as taxation, is tenuous at best. At the same
time, the numbers suggests that a worst-case scenario resulting in new
289. See NCAA Finances, supra note 279.
290. Id.
291. See Sargeant & Berkoitz, supra note 284 (Rutgers President expects the athletics
program to be self-sufficient within the next six years once it receives its funding from the Big
Ten conference, which would diminish the program’s need to rely on institutional support).
292. NCAA Finances, supra note 279.
293. Id.

FULL COURT PRESS (DO NOT DELETE)

60

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

7/2/2015 1:53 PM

[Vol. 35:1

taxation and increased employment costs for universities could indeed have
substantial financial implications for the least-profitable programs—even if
the doomsday prophecies put forward by some anti-union commentators
would likely not come to pass. Despite this uncertainty, a number of key
points are readily discernable.
First, it is apparent that the demarcation line between
“professional” and “amateur” athletics has become increasingly synthetic,
and that what used to be a true “student-athlete” system in decades past has
become a big business with close ties to the professional leagues. Second,
as a result of this commercialization of college sports, it is also apparent
that there is a great deal of money to go around at the college level—even
if the lion’s share of the profits now flow to the largest and most successful
programs and their coaches. Third, with this backdrop in mind, it is
difficult to dispute the fundamental accuracy of the Regional Director’s
determination in the Northwestern case regarding the employee-like control
and payment of scholarship athletes.
However, these observations do not resolve the difficult questions
surrounding college athletics, but merely open the door to further
complexities. As a matter of both labor law and social policy, the Regional
Director’s decision in Northwestern points in the right direction. Athletes
have no, or a very small, constituency—even a smaller one than their more
nakedly professional counterparts. 294 And it is unclear to what extent
political considerations, and the substantial vested interests of policymakers
and sports fans alike, will interfere with the necessary reforms in college
sports and perhaps with the Board’s review of the Northwestern decision
itself as well as a pushback potential from both the Supreme Court 295 and
congress. 296 Furthermore, the entrenched symbiotic relationship between
the professional leagues and the “amateur” system suggests that there are
294. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, O’Bannon v. NCAA, no. 09-cv-03329CW at 31 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (“many people felt that the removal of the reserve clause . . .
which ultimately enabled players to become free agents, thus leading to higher salaries – would
undermine the popularity of professional baseball. However, despite these predictions and fans’
stated opposition to rising salaries, Major League Baseball revenues continued to rise after the
removal of the reserve clause quote regarding opinion survey . . . would undermine the popularity
of professional ball.”). cf. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL: LABOR
RELATIONS IN AN AGE OF PROSPEROUS TURMOIL (2011).
295. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980). For recent demonstrations of a
fundamentally conservative Court, see William B. Gould IV, The Supreme Court, Job
Discrimination, Affirmative Action, Globalization, and Class Actions: Justice Ginsburg’s Term,
36 U. HAW. L. REV. 371 (2014); cf. Quinn v. Harris, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
296. See Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the Consequences of Unionizing
Student Athletes, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 113th Cong. (2014).
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few practicable alternatives on the horizon, and little motivation to
dramatically restructure the basic framework that currently exists.
Unionization at the college level could have a dramatic impact,
although instead of athlete compensation, the true focus of bargaining may
turn out to be player concerns that are developing at the professional level
as well, such as safety, concussions,297 and the abuse of painkillers. 298 The
election at Northwestern may not be the ultimate catalyst for major changes
to the existing collegiate system, but regardless of its ultimate resolution, it
demonstrates the increasing pressures that are building to effectuate some
type of long-term reform.

297. See William B. Gould IV, Football, Concussions, and Preemption: The Gridiron of
National Football League Litigation, 8 F.I.U. L. REV. 55, 68 (2012).
298. See Class Action Complaint, Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. 3:14-cv-02324,
2014 WL 2058098, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2014). .

